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THE BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY STANDARD
Lital Helman* and Gideon Parchomovsky**
Copyright liability for webhosting will be a key determinant of the evolu-
tion of the Internet in years to come. Depending on their design, the legal
rules that shape the liability of webhosts can stunt the development of the
Internet as a medium of expression or enhance it. Hence, adopting the opti-
mal liability regime is a matter of crucial importance.
This Article proposes a radical change in webhosts’ copyright liability
for illegal content posted by users. Our main thesis is that webhosts’ liability
should be guided by the “Best Available Technology” principle, according to
which webhosts that employ the best filtering technology available on the mar-
ket will be immune from liability for copyright infringement.
Adoption of our proposed liability regime would offer several key advan-
tages relative to the extant regime. First, it would provide webhosts with the
certainty they need to continue to operate and grow. Second, it would result
in superior and more balanced enforcement of the rights of copyright holders
and would achieve this at a much lower cost. Third, it would spur competi-
tion in the market for filtering technology and induce constant improvement
in enforcement technology. Fourth, and finally, it would dramatically reduce
the rate of copyright infringement suits against website operators and the cost
of adjudicating them.
We further demonstrate that the analytical framework we construct rep-
resents a superior approach not only to the liability of webhosts, but also to
those of file sharing and possibly Internet Service Provider liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright liability for webhosting will likely determine the evolution
of the Internet as a medium of expression in years to come. As user gen-
erated content (UGC) continues to grow, so do the implications of im-
posing liability on host sites, social networks, and various online forums
and blog platforms.1 Depending on their design, the legal rules that
shape the liability of webhosts can stunt the development of the Internet
as a medium of expression or facilitate it. Hence, adopting the optimal
liability regime is a matter of crucial importance.
This challenge did not escape the attention of Congress. In 1998,
Congress addressed this issue in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).2 Not surprisingly, the congressional solution represented a
compromise between the demands of the content industries to impose
liability on internet intermediaries and the pleas of the internet indus-
1. The popularity of UGC on websites has increased tremendously in recent years.
This includes blogs, social networks (such as Facebook and Twitter), photo and video
sharing sites (such as Flickr and YouTube), news sites (such as Slashdot, Groklaw, and
network news sites that seek viewer input, such as CNN.com), collaborative content sites, or
“wikis” (such as Wikipedia), games and virtual worlds (such as Second Life), and consumer
review websites (such as Yelp and Angie’s List). UGC has become so popular that
companies use UGC for advertising, see, for example, Doritos and Pepsi MAX Present:
Crash the Super Bowl, http://www.crashthesuperbowl.com/#/contest-info (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 10, 2011), and commercial websites solicit
customer reviews (such as Amazon.com and TripAdvisor).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
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tries to afford them sufficient breathing room to operate and grow.3 Con-
gress chose to reconcile the conflicting demands by adopting a two-pro-
nged approach consisting of both ex ante and ex post measures. Ex ante,
Congress exempted qualifying webhosts from the duty to detect infringe-
ments, save in the most egregious cases in which a “red flag” hangs over
content,4 and placed the burden of detecting infringements on the shoul-
ders of copyright owners.5 Ex post, after infringing content was identified
by copyright owners and upon receipt of notice to this effect, webhosts
were required by Congress to remove the offensive content expedi-
tiously.6 This approach is widely known as the “notice and takedown”
procedure.7
Congress formalized this arrangement in section 512(c) of the
Copyright Act. The section established a safe harbor that shields webhosts
from liability for monetary damages resulting from infringement commit-
ted by users, provided that they do not interfere with the content posted
by users, and as long as they adopt and reasonably implement a system
for removing infringing content at the request of copyright owners.8
Webhosts that do not qualify for the section 512(c) safe harbor are ex-
posed to copyright liability for hosting the infringing content and to the
full array of copyright damages.9
In this Article, we propose a radically different approach to websites’
liability for infringing content posted by users, which we term “the best
3. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 774
(8th Cir. 2005) (“It was designed to strike a balance between the interests of ISPs in
avoiding liability for infringing use of their services and the interest of copyright owners in
protecting their intellectual property and minimizing online piracy.”); see also Niva Elkin-
Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer
Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 28 (2005) (noting DMCA regime “reflects a
compromise between the demands of copyright owners . . . and the concerns of the
Internet industry”); Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 313, 314 (2009) (describing how Congress relied on lobbyists for copyright-
affected industries “to get together and negotiate the language for any new copyright
legislation”).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
5. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—
identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he burden is on the
copyright holder to provide notice of allegedly infringing material . . . .”).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
7. For the original, judicially created takedown regime, see Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
webhost faces contributory liability where it continues to publicly distribute infringing
material after being notified of infringement).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). Qualifications include § 512(c)(1)(B) (stating that
webhost “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”)
and § 512(c)(1)(C) (describing the notice and takedown policy for infringing content).
9. See id. §§ 502–505 (stating remedies for copyright infringement).
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available technology safe harbor.” Under our proposal, websites will be
immune from copyright liability—both direct and indirect—as long as
they can show that they employed the best filtering technology available
on the market at the time the alleged infringement occurred.10
The technological safe harbor we envision is a dynamic one; it will
change with technological progress, creating opportunities for technol-
ogy companies to develop superior filtering technologies and spurring
websites to adopt them. Because the best available technology is an adap-
tive standard, we expect it to underwrite constant competition in the mar-
ket for filtering technologies by guaranteeing successful improvers of ex-
isting standards that their improvements will be adopted by webhosts who
seek shelter under the wings of the technological safe harbor.
Hence, our legal standard would have beneficial effects on two levels:
First, it would serve as a constant spur for technology companies to im-
prove existing filtering technologies toward more accurate identification
and removal of infringing content on the one hand, and retention of
noninfringing content on the other. Second, it would induce websites to
implement the technologies, for failure to do so might expose them to
liability.
Finally, to clarify, the best available technology standard is not in-
tended to supplant the notice and takedown procedure, ex post. Content
owners who learn of the presence of infringing content on a particular
website will continue to have the option of notifying the website’s opera-
tor and demanding its removal. Likewise, our proposal retains the “re-
verse notice and put-back procedure,” which enables users to challenge
unwarranted takedowns and demand that their content be restored.11
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explore the inefficien-
cies of the current liability standard for webhosts under the DMCA and
the common law doctrines for direct and secondary liability. In Part II, we
present our proposal for a new technological safe harbor and explain its
virtues. In Part III, we deal with potential challenges and objections to
our proposal. In Part IV, we examine the possibility of expanding our
proposed safe harbor to areas other than webhost liability, particularly
peer-to-peer services and access providers. A short conclusion ensues.
I. THE CURRENT LIABILITY STANDARD FOR WEBHOSTS
The last two decades saw a substantial growth in online platforms. In
particular, the development of new technologies and business models al-
lowed members of the general public to post content on websites and
share it with others.12 While the emergence of platforms dedicated to
user content has generated an upsurge in creativity and originality, the
10. The best available technology would be one that minimizes the total number of
false positives and false negatives. For elaboration and discussion, see infra Part II.B.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2).
12. See supra note 1 (discussing types of user generated content). R
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materials posted by users are not always created by them, and in many
cases, the posting occurs without permission from the copyright owner.13
In the absence of fair use or some other defense, these cases almost cer-
tainly constitute a copyright infringement.14
The more interesting question is, who is liable for the infringement?
It is clear as a matter of positive law that the posting individuals bear
direct liability for their actions. Direct liability arises whenever an individ-
ual reproduces, adapts, distributes, publicly displays, or performs a copy-
righted work, or digitally performs a sound recording, without authoriza-
tion from the copyright owner.15 Consequently, the unauthorized posting
of copyrighted content constitutes an infringement of the exclusive rights
to reproduce, distribute, publicly display, or perform the content, and
may also amount to a violation of the owner’s adaptation right.16
A more challenging question is whether liability also attaches to the
operator of the hosting site or platform. In principle, webhosts may be
subject to either direct or indirect liability in these cases. As far as direct
liability is concerned, webhosts may bear liability for distributing, per-
forming, reproducing, and displaying content, and in some cases, for
adapting it.17 In addition, website operators are exposed to indirect liabil-
ity. Indirect liability comes in two varieties: contributory liability and vica-
rious liability.18 Contributory liability arises when one, with knowledge,
induces, enables, facilitates, or materially contributes to an infringing ac-
tivity by another.19 Vicarious liability attaches when one has the ability to
13. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (quoting plaintiff’s claim that “tens of thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in
hundreds of millions of views, were taken unlawfully from Viacom’s copyrighted works
without authorization”).
14. Posting of works online for wide access typically comes under one or more of the
exclusive rights of copyright owners enshrined in 17 U.S.C. § 106. Thus, for example,
§ 106(1) covers reproduction, § 106(2) covers derivative works, § 106(3) covers
distribution, § 106(4) and § 106(6) cover public performance of several types of works,
and § 106(5) covers the right to display several types of works publicly.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Liability is of course subject to defenses, such as fair use. Id.
§ 107.
16. Id. § 106.
17. Id.
18. Some commentators view inducement theory as a third, independent secondary
liability doctrine. Whether inducement is an independent source for derivative liability or
part of contributory liability is unclear. Compare Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement
from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 635, 636 (2008) (“Copyright law has three
separate doctrines for third-party liability: vicarious infringement; contributory
infringement; and inducing infringement.”), with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing inducement as one of two categories of
contributory liability (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 942 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).
19. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
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control or oversee an infringement and has a financial interest in it.20
The scope of these doctrines is so broad that in principle indirect liability
could attach to most active websites.21
The conflict between the interest of copyright owners in enhancing
enforcement by extending liability to operators of online services, and
the interest of the internet industries in minimizing their exposure to
liability prompted Congress to intervene.22 In 1998, Congress enacted the
DMCA, which represented a compromise between copyright owners and
the internet industries.23 For our purpose, the most important change
effected by the new legislation was embodied in Title II of the DMCA,
subsequently codified as section 512 of the Copyright Act.24 Section 512
establishes four safe harbors that shelter four central activities of online
service providers (OSPs)25 from monetary liability,26 provided that they
comply with certain threshold criteria.27 Most notably, to avail themselves
of the safe harbors, OSPs must meet two general conditions: They must
accommodate standard technical measures content owners use to protect
20. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(“When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials . . . the purposes of copyright law may
be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that
exploitation.”).
21. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary
Liability of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J.
111, 114–19 (2010) [hereinafter Helman, Secondary Liability] (discussing how doctrines
of indirect liability have expanded over time). Courts also often obscure the differences
between the doctrines, thus increasing the risk of liability. See id. at 116–17 (“The danger
in this confusion . . . is that lawmakers will bypass the phase of proving all the elements of a
particular doctrine, and will subject defendants to liability based on some assortment of
standards from these doctrines, thus subjecting a broader class of activities to liability than
originally intended.”); see also Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 395, 404 (2003)
(“[The Napster court’s] analysis seems to blur the line between the requirement under
contributory infringement that a culpable party have knowledge of the direct infringement
and the requirement under vicarious liability that a culpable party have control over the
specific infringer.” (discussing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002))).
22. The telecommunication industry was in fact active in lobbying against copyright
owners in this debate. For a description of the creation of the DMCA, see, for example,
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 350–56 (2004).
23. See supra note 3 (describing compromise in DMCA). R
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
25. As defined in § 512(k)(1).
26. Section 512(a) protects services which provide internet access. Section 512(b)
shields against liability for temporarily storing infringing materials. Section 512(c) protects
hosting services, and section 512(d) applies to “information location tools,” such as links to
content on other sites. Qualifying OSPs are exposed to a limited injunctive relief under
section 512(j).
27. The threshold requirements are fixed in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) and in the specific
safe harbors, § 512 (a)–(d).
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their materials, and they must adopt and reasonably implement a policy
for terminating infringing users.28
Of the four safe harbors, the one pertinent to our analysis is section
512(c), which covers hosting activities “at the direction of a user.”29 The
safe harbor specified in section 512(c) purports to relieve webhosts of
monetary damages for both direct and indirect liability.30
Effectively, section 512 expressly exempts webhosts from monitoring
user generated content ex ante;31 such monitoring is limited to “red flag”
cases.32 The main obligation the section imposes on webhosts is to re-
move offending content expeditiously, ex post, upon receiving notifica-
tion from a copyright owner.33
The design of the current safe harbor for webhosting has several
shortcomings. First, the current regime provides webhosts with almost no
incentive to participate in copyright enforcement. Regardless of one’s
view on the optimal level of copyright enforcement, this lack of incentive
creates an inefficient and wasteful enforcement scheme. Second, the pre-
sent legal regime does not afford sufficient certainty for webhosts. Third,
and finally, the current enforcement model runs the risk of curtailing too
much lawful speech, because copyright owners control enforcement and
because of private ordering that has emerged in the shadow of the law. In
the proceeding discussion we elaborate on each of these problems.
A. Lack of Incentives for Webhosts to Participate in Copyright Enforcement
As we noted earlier, with the exception of few cases, section 512 does
not require webhosts to monitor content on their site ex ante as a prereq-
uisite for enjoying the safe harbor.34 The section puts a premium on the
ex post phase: Upon being notified of the presence of infringing content
on their system, webhosts are required to remove the offending content
28. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1).
29. Id. § 512(c). The limitation of liability includes storage and allied functions, such
as providing access to the materials. See, e.g., Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 1132, 1146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (allowing safe harbor protection for automated
functions that facilitate access to content).
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998) (“The limitations in subsections (a)
through (d) protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for
direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.”); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40 (1998)
(same). But see infra note 66 and accompanying text (noting some commentators have R
suggested section 512’s safe harbor is effective only against direct copyright infringement).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on (1) a service provider monitoring its service
or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent
with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i) . . . .”).
32. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. R
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (creating safe harbor for service providers that
remove purportedly infringing content).
34. Id. § 512(m).
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and, in appropriate cases, terminate the user who uploaded the content
to the system.35
Absent notification from a content owner, webhosts are expected to
take independent action only if they have actual knowledge of infringe-
ment,36 or are “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent,”37 known as the “red flag” test.38 Otherwise,
webhosts’ best strategy is to remain passive and abstain from taking any
affirmative measures not required by the section. Indeed, it would be irra-
tional for profit-maximizing enterprises, such as many webhosts, to incur
the extra cost of deploying affirmative measures to protect third-party
rights when immunity is guaranteed irrespective of such measures.39
Importantly, “red flag” cases have been construed very narrowly by
the courts.40 For example, the Ninth Circuit opined that provision of
services to websites with names such as “illegal.net” and
“stolencelebritypics.com” is insufficient to raise a “red flag.”41 Other
courts concluded that third party takedown notices do not amount to a
“red flag,”42 nor do imprecise notices of infringement suffice for that pur-
pose.43 Most recently, a court held in Viacom v. YouTube that “knowledge
of prevalence of [infringing] activity in general is not enough,” and that
generally, “if investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to iden-
tify materials as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not
35. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C) (removal of content); id. § 512(i)(1)(A) (termination of
repeat infringers). Abstaining from removing the infringing files would cost the webhost its
protected status under section 512. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
36. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
37. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
38. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53, 57 (1998) (“[A] service provider need not
monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity . . . to claim this
limitation on liability . . . . However, if the service provider becomes aware of a ‘red flag’
from which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no
action.”); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 763 (9th Cir.) (describing
“red flag” test), modified, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2007).
39. See infra Part I.C for agreements between webhosts and content owners where
webhosts are willing to perform extra measures in return for legal certainty.
40. Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the US
Copyright Act, in Copyright Enforcement and the Internet 183, 190 (Irini A. Stamatoudi
ed., 2010) (“[T]he flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before the service
provider’s obligation to intervene comes into play . . . .”). Trademark case law took a
similar approach, requiring a high level of knowledge before a duty to cease infringements
arises. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(noting specificity of knowledge required in trademark infringement cases), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part on other grounds, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
41. Perfect 10, 481 F.3d at 763–64.
42. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
43. Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1092–93 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B) (2006) and discussing inadequacy of imprecise infringement
notices).
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‘red flags.’”44 Therefore, as a matter of legal reality, a webhost that ad-
heres to the threshold requirements of the DMCA and to its ex post pro-
cedure is most likely to be off the hook.45
Not only does the law provide no incentive for webhosts to filter out
copyrighted materials, but it actually provides them with a disincentive to
filter or monitor content outside the very narrow “red flag” bounds. This
disincentive is created by the second exception to the section 512(c) safe
harbor, which provides that a webhost will be ineligible for the safe har-
bor if it derives a financial benefit from an infringement that it can con-
trol.46 While the exact effect of this exception is unclear,47 at least one
court ruled that the ability to filter copyrighted materials is a factor that
can satisfy the “control” prong of this exception.48 This interpretation
discourages webhosts from utilizing filters for fear of losing eligibility for
the section 512(c) safe harbor.49
At the end of the day, then, the message Congress conveyed to
webhosts is very simple: They are expected to remain passive in the ex
ante phase. An attempt by webhosts to screen may even run the risk of
exposure to considerable monetary liability.50
The congressional choice to exempt webhosts from detecting in-
fringements is puzzling. Webhosts’ active participation in copyright en-
forcement could be most valuable. Specifically, active monitoring and fil-
tering by webhosts can effectively complement the enforcement efforts of
content owners. Webhosts are best situated to disrupt infringing activities
ex ante, at relatively low cost.51 Between content owners and webhosts,
the latter have better ability to deploy automatic filters and to identify
44. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D.
Cal. 2009)).
45. Id. at 525 (“[The DMCA’s] safe harbor is clear and practical: if a service provider
knows (from notice from the owner, or a ‘red flag’) of specific instances of infringement,
the provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the
owner to identify the infringement.”).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). This exception closely resembles the doctrine of
vicarious liability. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. For the definition of R
vicarious liability under copyright law, see supra note 20 and accompanying text. R
47. See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. R
48. Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV064436 FMC AJWX, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. June 20, 2007) (“[T]he requirement presupposes some antecedent ability to limit or
filter copyrighted material.”), appeal dismissed per curiam, 562 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2009);
see also Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(“[T]he statute presupposes a service provider’s control of its system or network.”).
49. On the other hand, in other cases a webhost was not penalized for using a filter.
See UMG, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (noting Veoh took more measures than required under
DMCA); Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (noting Veoh took “active steps to limit incidents
of infringement on its website and works diligently to keep unauthorized works off its
website”).
50. See supra notes 46, 48–49 and accompanying text. R
51. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
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and block materials as they are loaded, prior to their posting.52 Copyright
owners, by contrast, cannot apply automatic filters to block content from
being uploaded. Nor can they limit their search to newly uploaded con-
tent. Thus, content owners must constantly monitor the entire repertoire
of every site on the Internet, in every file format, in order to locate in-
fringing materials. Furthermore, monitoring and filtering by webhosts
would obviate the need for duplicative enforcement efforts by content
owners. Under the current regime, each copyright owner must deploy
enforcement measures in order to enforce her rights. In contrast,
webhosts can enforce the rights of multiple content owners at once by
running the same technological system. Indeed, each webhost could per-
form more cost-effectively the activities that are currently performed by
multiple content owners.
Monitoring by webhosts would also allow enforcement of the rights
of some content owners whose rights may not be enforced at all under
the current law. The high expenditures involved in policing the Internet
on a regular basis and issuing takedown requests may be prohibitive for
many content owners, particularly individual authors, and independent
studios and publishers.53 Cooperation with webhosts may be the only fea-
sible way to enforce the rights of these content owners.
A corollary, less obvious, cost of the current regime is its effect on
the market for enforcement technologies. Currently, technology compa-
nies have only partial motivation to come up with superior enforcement
technologies.54 Given that at present only few websites engage in some
sort of filtering, the lion’s share of demand for enforcement technologies
comes from large commercial content owners.55 While the demand of
such entities underwrites a certain level of competition in the market for
enforcement technologies, it falls short of inducing full competition.
Rightsholders have no access to webhosts’ codes to install their desired
filtering tools, and webhosts have minimal incentive to allow them to do
so.56 Indeed, filtering companies offer products that scan the entire
Internet for infringements, for the use of copyright owners.57 But this
method is obviously far less cost-effective than if webhosts were locating
52. We are omitting from the framework the option of third-party filtering or ISP
monitoring. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, IV.B.
53. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 617, 619 (2008) [hereinafter
Wu, Tolerated Use] (noting enforcement costs might discourage copyright owners from
enforcing their rights). In fact, filtering can be quite pricy. See infra note 121 (discussing R
cost of particular filtering service).
54. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. R
55. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. R
56. As explained above, webhosts are entitled to the DMCA safe harbor regardless of
their use of enforcement technologies. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2006) (showing DMCA
safe harbor does not require “a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively
seeking facts indicating infringing activity”); see also supra notes 34–49 and accompanying R
text. But see infra Part I.C (discussing agreements between webhosts and rightsholders).
57. These products include, for example, Gracenote, Advestigo, Auditude, Vobile,
and Attributor.
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infringements ex ante. What is more, the market is skewed toward the
needs of content owners, incentivizing companies to develop enforce-
ment technologies that identify as many infringements as possible with
little concern for false positives.58
The cost of the extant regime is exacerbated by the time-sensitive
value of intellectual property. As a general rule, copyright content is most
valuable immediately after its release.59 With the passage of time, the
value of content diminishes. As a result, by the time offending content is
finally removed, it may be virtually valueless.
What is more, current law does not mandate a “take-down, stay-
down” policy, which would prevent infringing content from being re-
posted by another user.60 As a result, content owners must send and re-
send notices for each and every unauthorized upload even on the same
platform.61 Accordingly, in many instances, enforcement under the cur-
rent regime is a Sisyphean task with no real potential for curing
infringements.
Notably, the problem we discuss exists regardless of one’s view of the
optimal level of copyright enforcement. The current enforcement
scheme is problematic even under the view that copyright enforcement is
excessive. First, as we show, enforcement under the current regime is so-
cially wasteful. Second, the claim of overenforcement is usually con-
cerned with erroneous removal of permissive content; few would argue
against enforcement of blatant, obvious infringements.62
58. For example, BayTSP, touting the accuracy of its system, has successfully marketed
its Content Authentication Platform to major movie studios, music labels, and sports
leagues, but it makes no mention of protecting fair uses of copyrighted digital content. See
BayTSP Announces 15 Customers Using its Content Authentication Platform for
Copyright, Business Intelligence and Monetization, All Business (Mar. 2, 2009), http://
www.allbusiness.com/media-telecommunications/movies-sound-recording/11799800-
1.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing that fifteen companies are
using BayTSP’s platform and describing underlying technologies as “best of breed”).
59. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997)
(recognizing importance of protecting “property rights in time-sensitive information”
regarding “hot news”).
60. Under a “take-down, stay-down” policy, the webhost creates a database of material
it had removed in the past per a request of a copyright owner. If any user tries to upload
the same content that has been removed, the webhost would recognize the material and
block the attempt.
61. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs,
50 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 591 (2008) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Separating] (“[A]bsent a pre-
upload clearance requirement, one may anticipate that at least some of the content the
notified service provider takes down will promptly reappear, hydra-like, on other hosts’
sites.”).
62. As we discuss in Part I.B below, we agree that erroneous takedowns are a problem
under the current regime, and believe our regime addresses this concern as well. See also
infra Part I.C.
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B. Legal Uncertainty Under the Section 512(c) Safe Harbor
One of Congress’s goals in enacting the section 512(c) safe harbor
was to increase legal certainty for webhosts.63 Yet section 512(c) as it cur-
rently stands falls short of this mark.64
A key uncertainty concerns whether section 512(c) immunizes
webhosts against indirect liability as a general matter. While the statutory
history appears fairly settled that it does,65 some commentators have sug-
gested that section 512 is effective only against direct copyright
infringement.66
A related and better-founded doubt arises as to whether section
512(c) protects against vicarious liability.67 The language of the section
states that when webhosts have the right and ability to control an infringe-
ment and derive direct financial benefit from it, they will be excluded
from the protection of the safe harbor.68 This statutory language appears
to indicate that Congress carved out vicarious liability from the scope of
the section 512(c) safe harbor. Several scholars have suggested that
Congress intended this result,69 and, indeed, this view has some support
in the case law.70 Other commentators, however, opine that the safe har-
63. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998) (noting goal to “provide[ ] greater
certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may
occur in the course of their activities”); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40 (1998) (same).
64. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts
233, 234 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Decoding] (“Despite the importance of the DMCA safe
harbors for ISPs, basic aspects of them remain unclear.”); see also Helman, Secondary
Liability, supra note 21, at 135–36 (describing uncertainty in relationship between section R
512 and subsequent legislation and case law).
65. See supra note 30. R
66. Mark Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345, 1369–72 (2004) (“This safe harbor
largely preserves the availability of relief against service providers on the basis of secondary
liability for infringement committed using the service, though the safe harbors may
somewhat heighten the requirements for holding the provider secondarily liable.”). But
see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
district court’s conclusion that “subsection 512(d) [does not] shelter[ ] contributory
infringers”).
67. For the definition of vicarious liability under copyright law, see supra note 20 and R
accompanying text.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006).
69. 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 12B.04[A][2][b], at 12B-57 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe
Harbors, 6 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 101, 104 & n.23, 113–14 & n.53 (2007);
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L.J. 1833, 1882 (2000)
(“Subsection (B), therefore, does no more than condition nonliability on the nonexistence
of vicarious liability.”).
70. CoStar Grp. Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001) (“[T]he
DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement because it codifies both
elements of vicarious liability.”), aff’d, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). The appellate court,
however, held that if an ISP is liable under common law, it “could still look to the DMCA
for a safe harbor if it fulfilled the conditions therein.” CoStar, 373 F.3d at 555; see also
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bor does protect against vicarious liability and have interpreted the statute
to reflect this result.71
Another source of uncertainty concerns the eligibility of webhosts
that induce copyright infringement for the section 512(c) safe harbor.
Under one interpretation, such webhosts are ineligible for the 512(c)
safe harbor.72 Under this interpretation, and in light of the broad con-
struction of inducement the Supreme Court espoused in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., any webhost whose business model is
predicated on large volumes of traffic runs the risk of falling outside the
safe harbor.73 In Grokster the Court ruled that the presence of infringing
content often serves as a draw that increases traffic to websites.74 Hence,
the availability of pirated content on a site may constitute prima facie
evidence of inducement.
The Viacom v. YouTube court, attending to this issue for the first time,
did not adopt this interpretation, holding instead that questions of “in-
tent” or “neutrality” towards infringements are irrelevant to eligibility
under the DMCA.75 Some district courts, however, appear to lean towards
the view that if webhosts “encouraged or fostered . . . infringement, they
would be ineligible for the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.”76 This ques-
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “financial
benefit” under section 512(c) should be interpreted consistent with the similar language
used to define vicarious infringement); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same).
71. See Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability
Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 295, 305 (2002) (describing how courts have “collapsed some
of the distinctions between traditional secondary liability and the DMCA” though Congress
did not intend that result); Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading
Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 1005, 1028–31 (2000) (“[T]he committee reports leave no doubt
that Congress intended to provide some relief from vicarious liability.”). To reach this
result, scholars argued that the term “control” for purposes of liability under section
512(c) should be interpreted as requiring more than just “capability to control” as is
accepted under the common law test of vicarious liability. This interpretation is consistent
with the fact that the capability to block infringements is mandated by the notice and
takedown procedure under section 512(c)(1)(C). See Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1082, 1093–94 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Congress could not have intended for courts to
hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA
because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the DMCA.”). Likewise,
commentators contended that “‘receiv[ing]’ a financial ‘benefit’” under section 512(c) is
a heightened requirement compared with merely “‘having’ a financial ‘interest’” under
vicarious liability. Lee, Decoding, supra note 64, at 241. R
72. See Ginsburg, Separating, supra note 61, at 591–92 (describing neutrality R
prerequisite to safe harbor eligibility).
73. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005).
74. Id.
75. 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
76. Arista Records LLC v. USENET.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); see also Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL
6355911, at *16 n.26 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (noting as one of the grounds of ineligibility
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tion is contested in the appeal in Viacom v. YouTube which is pending in
the Second Circuit.77
As a result of the ambiguity in section 512(c), services can never be
certain that they are really protected from vicarious liability or from
claims of inducement—a vague doctrine in and of itself78—even if they
comply with all the statutory criteria that qualify one for the safe harbor.
Uncertainty comes at a cost, especially when safe harbors are con-
cerned. First, an unclear safe harbor is largely self-defeating; safe harbors,
by their very nature, are supposed to provide actors with certainty.79 The
point and purpose of a safe harbor is to mitigate the results of ambiguous
or excessively broad liability doctrines. In such areas of the law, where
liability is predicated on broad, vague standards that cannot be easily clar-
ified, it is desirable to establish liability free zones as long as the safe
harbors’ conditions are clearly specified. Otherwise, lawmakers substitute
one vague doctrine for another.80 A vague safe harbor is of little practical
use.81
Second, and relatedly, the uncertainty shrouding the section 512(c)
safe harbor creates an incentive for webhosts to adopt a risk-averse dispo-
sition. As John Calfee and Richard Craswell famously demonstrated,
vague standards induce actors to overinvest in precautions since failing to
make the necessary marginal investment in precautions exposes them to
full liability.82 In other words, insufficient investment in precautions
of defendant to section 512(c) that “[p]laintiffs’ claims are premised on active inducement
of infringement, not passive transmission or storage of infringing materials”).
77. Notice of Appeal, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02103 (LLS) (2d
Cir. Aug. 11, 2010). Part of the case has now settled, with the National Music Publishers’
Association (NMPA) and Google reaching a settlement. See Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice as to Certain Appellants, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc.,
No. 1:07-CV-03582 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/
federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-3342/372/0.pdf?1313810498 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); see also Press Release, Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n, NMPA Reaches
Resolution of Copyright Infringement Lawsuit Against YouTube (Aug, 17, 2011), available
at  http://www.nmpa.org/media/showwhatsnew.asp?id=57 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing settlement between YouTube and NMPA); YouTube, Creating New
Opportunities for Publishers and Songwriters (Aug. 11, 2011), http://youtube-global.
blogspot.com/2011/08/creating-new-opportunities-for.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (same).
78. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers: A
Comparison of the US Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal
Court’s KaZaa Ruling, 11 Media & Arts L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2006) (describing uncertainty
regarding inducement doctrine after Sony and Grokster).
79. Legal certainty was one of the explicit goals Congress had in mind while enacting
section 512(c). See supra note 63. R
80. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1483, 1502–03, 1510–11 (2007) (considering benefits of crafting clear and certain safe
harbor rules).
81. Id.
82. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 986 (1984) (“[E]xcessive damage awards will tend
to increase any incentives to overcomply . . . .”); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
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comes at the double cost of paying for the (insufficient) precautions and
incurring liability. Overinvesting in precautions, by contrast, raises the
probability that no liability will attach. The adoption of excessive precau-
tions is socially wasteful, and in this case, it is likely to produce negative
externalities as it leads to unnecessary removal of content and censoring
too much speech for fear of liability.83
Third, vague legal doctrines give rise to strike suits.84 Powerful indus-
try participants can take advantage of ambiguous doctrines to threaten
legal action against defendants who do not have the financial wherewithal
to engage in lengthy and expensive legal battles. Perhaps the best recent
illustration of this concern can be found in Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks,
Inc.85 and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.,86 where two different
plaintiffs sued the same video webhost for copyright infringement. In
both cases, Veoh won summary judgment based on the section 512(c)
safe harbor.87 Despite its victories in those cases,88 the legal fees Veoh
incurred drove the company to bankruptcy.89 In light of Veoh’s fate,
other small companies may simply choose to settle meritless suits even
though the law is on their side.90
C. Harms to Speech and Users’ Interests
An additional concern emanating from the present regime, which
places enforcement in the hands of copyright owners, is that too much
speech will be curtailed. Naturally, the interests of commercial content
owners are not perfectly aligned with those of society at large. Commer-
cial content owners, who are most likely to bring infringement suits, are
interested in maximizing their revenues; society at large has a much
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 873 (1998)
(observing “if injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful
precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably
curtailed”).
83. See infra Part I.C.
84. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J.
Legal Stud. 437, 440 (1988) (noting imperfect information as a primary incentive to
bringing frivolous lawsuits); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement
of Litigation, 10 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 4 (1990) (presenting “a model that explains strike
suits as a result of defendant uncertainty regarding the merit of plaintiffs’ claims”).
85. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
86. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
87. UMG, 665 F. Supp. 2d. at 1118; Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
88. UMG is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Appellants’ Brief, UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 09-56777 (9th Cir. June 17, 2010), 2010 WL 3706518.
89. Joe Mullin, Uh-oh Veoh: Big Copyright Win Can’t Save Online Video-Sharing
Company, Corporate Counsel (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.
jsp?id=1202445517277 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The court refused to grant
Veoh its request for legal fees. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-
5744 AHM (AJWx), 2010 WL 1407316, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2010).
90. Besides the fear that companies would settle meritless suits, uncertainty may lead
them to seek agreements with content owners in order to avoid litigation in the first place.
See infra Part I.C.
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broader interest in creativity and free speech. This misalignment has sev-
eral adverse consequences.
First, under the current framework, the initial decision as to whether
content is infringing rests solely with copyright owners, who can order the
removal of posts at their sole discretion.91 As interested parties, copyright
owners are prone to err on the side of more protection and will thus
regard fewer cases than optimal as noninfringing or fair uses.92 Indeed,
copyright holders rarely paused to contemplate the possibility of fair use
before requesting the removal of a post until the rulings in Online Policy
Group v. Diebold, Inc. and Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., where the courts
held that a demand to remove content without considering whether it
qualifies as fair use may amount to a copyright misuse.93 Tellingly, a study
of the behavior of copyright owners found excessive and even manipula-
tive use of the takedown process.94
Website operators, for their part, expeditiously comply with the take-
down requests of content owners. As Edward Lee has explained, “it would
be foolish, if not a breach of corporate fiduciary duty, for [webhosts] not
to do so.”95 The structure of section 512(c) and the risk of becoming
ineligible for the safe harbor spur webhosts to side with content owners,
without providing adequate protection for users. The net result is that
more speech than necessary is being removed from websites.
Online speech is further diminished as a consequence of private ar-
rangements between content owners and webhosts.96 The most well
known private agreement in this context is the “User Generated Content
Principles” (UGC Principles) that was established in 2007 by leading con-
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (providing person who notifies webhost of
infringing material must be copyright holder or holder’s agent). Users can contest this
decision and request the material to be reposted within fourteen days unless the copyright
holder notifies the webhost that it has filed an action seeking a court order. Id. § 512(g).
92. See Sonia K. Katyal, Filtering, Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience, 32 Colum.
J.L. & Arts 401, 411 (2009) (arguing that copyright owners may “label all [debatable]
detected behavior as ‘illegal,’ and refer to their adversaries as outlaws or pirates”); see also
Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online
Copyright Enforcement, 89 Or. L. Rev. 81, 127 (2010) (noting that “[i]n the project of
online surveillance, rights owners have historically put zeal before accuracy”).
93. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151–52 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
94. Pan C. Lee, Daniel S. Park, Allen W. Wang & Jennifer M. Urban, Public
Knowledge, Copyright Abuse and Notice 3 (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/files/CRAabuseandnotice_final_posted.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
see also Greg Sandoval, YouTube Users Caught in Warner Music Spat, CNET News (Jan.
27, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing Warner Music Group’s amplified DMCA notices
following a licensing quarrel with YouTube).
95. Lee, Decoding, supra note 64, at 234. R
96. The emergence of private ordering in this area demonstrates the shortcomings of
the extant regime. It shows that webhosts are willing to expend considerable amounts to
purchase the peace of mind that the section 512(c) safe harbor was supposed to grant
them.
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tent producers such as Disney and Viacom, and service providers, includ-
ing Microsoft and MySpace.97 Such agreements provide webhosts with
semicontractual protection against liability98 in exchange for their agree-
ment to take various measures to curb copyright infringements by users,
including employment of filtering systems.99
One may argue that there is nothing wrong with private ordering
that leads to a more efficient allocation of filtering obligations.100 But
private ordering in this context suffers from several flaws. First, private
arrangements are underinclusive. The majority of content owners and
webhosts, let alone newcomers in both industries, are not covered by con-
tracts of this sort.101 Undercoverage has adverse implications for competi-
tion. The enhanced protection of major parties increases the exposure to
litigation of nonparty webhosts,102 and simultaneously creates considera-
ble surplus revenue for major parties. This reality sets hurdles for non-
party rivals to compete with parties to these agreements, which are typi-
cally major parties to begin with.103 For the same reason, agreements
between major industry players may constitute a barrier to entry for new-
comers. The surplus resources of major parties render it difficult for nas-
cent rivals to compete with them. Moreover, content owners may refuse
to enter agreements with webhosts that they would prefer to see vanish
97. Principles for User Generated Content Services [hereinafter UGC Principles],
http://www.ugcprinciples.com (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 14,
2011). Avoiding liability is probably not the only reason to enter these agreements.
Cooperation may result in business opportunities, including the opportunity for webhosts
to derive financial benefit from copyrighted content, which would otherwise expose
webhosts to liability under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
98. UGC Principles, supra note 97, § 14. R
99. Id. § 3.
100. See supra Part I.A for discussion of the inefficiency of enforcement obligations
under the current regime.
101. The signatories of the UGC Principles have intended the Principles to become
“best practices” and apply beyond the immediate signatories. By shaping best practices, the
UGC Principles may deem a site that fails to comply an outlier in litigation processes,
rather than a law-abiding, compliance-oriented company. See 3 Ian C. Ballon, E-
Commerce and Internet Law 49.05[2] (2010–2011 update). While there is still no case law
on the status of the UGC Principles, there are currently no signs—beyond the parties’
intention—that the Principles apply beyond the signed parties. The UGC Principles—or
another agreement—might, however, acquire a stronger status in the future.
102. It is generally more cost-effective for rightsholders to focus their litigation efforts
on major, commercial webhosts that arguably profit from infringements. If copyright
owners enter agreements with major webhosts, however, their resources are freed to
pursue litigation against nonparty webhosts.
103. Indeed, the UGC Principles are open to the participation of new technology
providers. Yet, webhosts may elect not to participate in it for various reasons. In that case,
the decision would have an undercoverage effect. Moreover, agreements between content
owners and technology companies are, obviously, not open to the participation of any
webhosts that wish to sign them. In these cases, the problem of undercoverage is
exacerbated.
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from the market.104 Alternatively, rightsholders can wage unjustified legal
claims against nonparty webhosts, intended to compel them to enter such
agreements. This, in turn, may cause some of them to exit the market and
reduce competition.105
More importantly for our purposes, collective private ordering to de-
termine the nature of online filtering may injure users’ freedom of ex-
pression. Webhosts comprise a central venue for speech, but no provision
in the UGC Principles assures that webhosts would filter posts sparingly to
avoid curtailing more speech than necessary.106 In fact, filtering mecha-
nisms that webhosts use are often unable to distinguish a verbatim copy
from a highly transformative use that contains a fraction of a copyrighted
work for parody, criticism, or educational purposes.107
That webhosts and content owners choose to externalize costs on
nonmembers is not utterly surprising. Private arrangements produce an
incentive to choose norms that externalize costs on nonmembers of the
arrangement. As Eric Posner observed, “Groups have a strong[er] incen-
tive to adopt or develop norms that externalize costs than those that
merely maximize joint welfare without producing negative
externalities.”108
Worse yet, as opposed to a law, which can be challenged by anyone
who is injured by it, collective private ordering to determine online filter-
ing may injure users’ freedom of expression without any meaningful con-
trols.109 Withholding relevant information from nonmembers of the
agreements further impedes their ability to effectively challenge the ar-
rangement and maintain their rights.
Having explained the shortcomings of the extant regime, in the next
Part we will introduce an alternative approach for webhost liability, which
104. Claims in this spirit have often been raised against copyright owners by digital
services in litigation. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving defendant, who was found to be intentional copyright
infringer, claiming that music labels engaged in antitrust violations, including, inter alia,
refusing access to hash-based filtering without obtaining a license). Similarly, webhosts may
decline to filter out content of some content owners.
105. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing risk of strike suits). R
106. The most concrete obligation pertaining to fair use in the UGC Principles is in
section 6, which reads: “When sending notices and making claims of infringement,
Copyright Owners should accommodate fair use.” UGC Principles, supra note 97, § 6. R
107. See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Everyone Who’s Made a Hitler Parody Video, Leave
the Room, Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog (Apr. 20, 2010), http://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/everyone-who-s-made-hitler-parody-leave-room (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing YouTube’s filter for identifying as infringing
posts that include mere fractions of copyrighted works, including parodies).
108. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697,
1723 (1996).
109. There is in fact very low use of the “counter notification” procedure under the
DMCA. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 621, 679–80 (2006) (“Only seven counternotices are
included in the Chilling Effects dataset . . . .”).
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we dub “the technological safe harbor.” As we will show, the adoption of
this model will alleviate many of the problems that plague the current
legal standard.
II. THE BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY SAFE HARBOR
In this Part we advance our technological safe harbor regime. We
submit that the technological safe harbor will not only mitigate many of
the problems discussed in Part I, but will also improve the overall utility
of the copyright enforcement system. Part II begins by describing the
conceptual framework for the technological safe harbor model. We then
move to discussing the best available technology standard and practical
aspects of the filtering process. Finally, we address the benefits of the
model. We show that the technological safe harbor model is welfare en-
hancing on two levels. First, it would create an incentive for the relevant
parties to filter content in a manner that respects both copyright and fair
use. Second, it would spur dynamic competition in the market of filtering
mechanisms by third parties.
A. The Conceptual Framework
In his seminal work, The Cost of Accidents, Guido Calabresi introduced
the concept of “the cheapest cost avoider.”110 Calabresi persuasively ar-
gued that the burden of minimizing the harm from accidents should be
imposed on the party that can achieve this result at the least possible
cost.111 Although Calabresi’s idea is very powerful, it is also a bit mislead-
ing. The real challenge for lawmakers is not to allocate liability to the party
who can abate costs more cheaply, but rather to identify the mechanism by
which costs may be minimized. The difference is not a matter of seman-
tics. It is often the case that the best way to minimize the cost of acci-
dents—or, in our case, infringements—is via collaboration between the
parties involved.112 Furthermore, sometimes the cost of avoidance may be
minimized by involving third parties.113 The challenge of online infringe-
ments by websites is precisely such a case.
The challenge of online infringements involves two dimensions. The
first is temporal. Online infringements may be addressed ex ante, before
110. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 139 (1970) (introducing notion that liability should be imposed on cheapest, or
least, cost avoider in context of tort law).
111. Id.; see also Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal
Tax Liability, 63 Tax L. Rev. 797, 819 (2010) (noting rationale of least harm avoider,
together with considerations of judgment-proof defendants, is standard economic
rationale for vicarious liability in tort law).
112. Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12 Theoretical Inquiries L. 59,
70–72 (2011) (noting that “the normative question (concerning the scope that
ownership’s authority should have) . . . [is] one of coordination in a world entertaining an
owner and a mass of non-owners”).
113. See infra Part II.A.2.
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content is posted, through careful screening of the materials posted onto
websites, or ex post, after content is uploaded, via a notice and takedown
procedure. The second dimension requires policymakers to decide on
which party to impose the burden of preventing infringement. The bur-
den can either be imposed on content owners or on webhosts. Of course,
combinations of the above options are also possible. But we commence
our discussion with the four basic options and add the combinations
later.
1. Two-Party Analysis. — Consider first the option of ex ante avoid-
ance through filtering. The duty to screen all content and filter out in-
fringing material may be imposed either on content owners or on
webhosts. Imposing the duty on content owners makes very little sense as
they have no access to the code of hosting sites, and website operators will
rightly be reluctant to grant content owners access privileges to their pro-
prietary code or otherwise intervene in the core operation of their busi-
ness.114 Without access, content owners will not be able to install and
update their filtering systems.115 But even if access were to be mandated,
filtering by content owners raises the obvious problem of duplicative ex-
penditures that could be easily avoided. Given that detection and filtering
are characterized by economies of scale, it makes no sense to require
each and every content owner to engage in filtering on each and every
internet site; this would inject serious delays into the system and would be
overall welfare-reducing.
What about the alternative option of imposing the responsibility to
filter on webhosts? This option is clearly more sensible. Webhosts can
easily implement filters and will realize the economies of scale inherent
in detection. Each website can enforce the rights of multiple content
owners by running the same technological system at a relatively small in-
crease in the marginal cost. Webhosts, however, face a serious informa-
tion problem. In many cases, they have no way of knowing which materi-
als are copyrighted by someone other than the users who have uploaded
them.116 Nor can they know if the upload was authorized. It must be
borne in mind that the quantity of content is growing at a dizzying rate
and most works, although protected, are not registered by their au-
114. Unauthorized access to computers is illegal under federal law as well as under
various state laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2511 (2006) (prohibiting, respectively,
computer fraud and interception of electronic communications); see also Max Stul
Oppenheimer, Internet Cookies: When is Permission Consent?, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 383,
396–98 (2006) (discussing federal and state laws concerning unauthorized access to
computers).
115. Because of the lack of access to webhosts’ codes, anti-infringement tools that are
currently on the market typically constantly scan the entire Internet for infringements. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. R
116. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions
for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175, 1186 (2010) (“[I]nadequacies in notice about
copyright claims and reduced incentives to register copyright claims have contributed to
substantial difficulties in tracking down who owns which rights in which works.”).
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thors.117 Webhosts have no realistic way to overcome this problem. And
they should not be expected to do so.
This leaves us with the ex post solutions. Ex post intervention falls
prey to the same problems we just discussed. Ex post, after the offending
materials are posted, the relevant remedial step is removal. The duty to
remove infringing content may be imposed on either content owners or
webhosts. The option of requiring content owners to remove offending
materials can be readily rejected. Without full access to the proprietary
code of websites, content owners will not be able to perform this task, and
webhosts are not likely to grant them the requisite access. Imposing the
duty to remove on content owners will likewise reintroduce the problem
of massive duplicative expenditures, as it will require content owners to
search for infringing content before they can proceed to remove it. This
problematic scenario is what section 512 currently offers.
Imposing the duty to remove on webhosts without more will also ac-
complish little. In principle, webhosts can easily remove content from
their websites, but once again they will lack the requisite information to
perform this task. Except perhaps in the most obvious cases of infringe-
ment that involve high-profile commercial works, webhosts will have no
way of identifying infringing content.118
Our discussion of the discrete solutions makes it clear that the chal-
lenge of online infringement calls for a composite solution predicated on
collaboration between content owners, webhosts, and technology provid-
ers. Put differently, the optimal solution in this case involves a certain
apportionment of responsibilities among the actors involved. Begin with
the content owners. They are best situated to deal with the informational
dimension of the problem. After all, they possess all the relevant informa-
tion about their protected works. Hence, it makes sense to impose on
content owners the duty to inform webhosts about the legal status of their
works. Concretely, content owners should be required to submit informa-
tion on their protected works to website operators so that they can in-
clude these works in the database of copyrighted works. Once this infor-
mation is received, webhosts can employ filtering systems to detect
infringements.
Webhosts, for their part, should be entrusted with the tasks of
screening for infringing material and preventing it from being posted if it
matches copyrighted works in the database.119 Webhosts should also be
responsible for removing infringing content upon receiving notice from
copyright owners or whenever the technological systems they employ dis-
cover infringing content that they initially missed.
117. See infra notes 136–148 and accompanying text. R
118. See Samuelson et al., supra note 116, at 1186 (“[I]nadequacies in notice about R
copyright claims and reduced incentives to register copyright claims have contributed to
substantial difficulties in tracking down who owns which rights in which works.”).
119. For a discussion of the degree of match needed for blocking the material, see
infra Part III.A.
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Once webhosts employ software solutions capable of content match-
ing, they will be able to search for infringing material on a continuous
basis and remove offending content whenever it is found. Furthermore,
in this technological reality, content owners would be able to submit new
copyrighted works to webhosts on an ongoing basis and have the
webhosts enforce their rights for them. Of course, if content owners
somehow detect infringing content that has been missed by the technol-
ogy, they should be able to notify the webhosts and ask that the putatively
infringing content be removed.
2. Multi-Party Analysis. — The addition of third parties to the analysis
suggests an even more cost-effective solution.120 Instead of allocating the
filtering responsibility to every webhost, it is possible to entrust all filter-
ing duties to independent providers who will provide filtering services to
all webhosts. In fact, doing so will result in a dramatic cost reduction. To
see why, consider the cost structure of filtering. The fixed cost associated
with filtering is quite significant. A filtering system needs to be purchased,
installed, updated, and maintained. The marginal cost of filtering is con-
stant and comparatively low. Once a filtering system is up and running,
the cost of screening content does not vary within very broad limits. Nor
is the quality of the screening compromised. Hence, the average cost of
screening diminishes with scale.
The fact that filtering displays economies of scale suggests that it
makes no sense to require each webhost to conduct its own filtering. Im-
posing the responsibility to filter on each and every webhost would mean
that hundreds of thousands of webhosts will need to incur the relatively
high fixed cost of setting up and operationalizing their own filtering sys-
tems. Worse yet, such responsibility might pose a risk that small, noncom-
mercial webhosts will be deprived of the proposed safe harbor and be
exposed to liability merely because they cannot afford to install the fil-
ter.121 This would raise entry barriers for newcomers and have an
anticompetitive effect on the market for webhosts.122
A dramatic cost saving could be effected in this case if webhosts were
to outsource filtering to a third party that would carry out this activity for
them. The establishment of a central filtering clearinghouse that would
vet content for all webhosts would eliminate duplicative expenditures on
enforcement technology, without scarifying its efficiency.
Naturally, a solution of a single clearinghouse raises other concerns.
Such a clearinghouse would constitute a monopoly that would be likely to
120. We are grateful to Peter Siegelman for suggesting this solution to us.
121. This can be quite a steep price. As of 2007, Audible Magic was charging sites a
monthly fee that could add up to about $1 million annually for its filtering services. Kevin
J. Delaney et al., Policing Web Video with ‘Fingerprints’, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at B1.
122. Competition in the filtering market might partially alleviate this concern; yet it is
likely that competition in the market for filtering technologies will result in multiple
filtering technologies with varying prices, with the better screening technologies being the
more expensive ones.
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overcharge webhosts for its services and might provide inferior service.
The monopoly problem may be easily sidestepped, however. Instead of
setting up a single clearinghouse, it is possible to establish several clear-
inghouses—say, five or six—which would compete among themselves to
lure webhosts.123 Competition among clearinghouses over filtering ser-
vices will ensure competitive prices to webhosts, as well as quality of
service.
The creation of several filtering clearinghouses, as opposed to one,
would generate another important advantage. It is likely to create compe-
tition in the market for filtering technologies. The filtering centers we
envision are essentially service providers. To perform their task they will
need filtering systems, which they can either make themselves or procure
from other technology companies. The presence of several centers that
compete for clientele would mean that each of them would have an in-
centive to adopt superior filtering systems as they are produced. This, in
turn, would give technology companies that produce filtering systems a
strong financial motivation to come up with improved filtering products.
In light of the many advantages of this model, in terms of both dy-
namic and static efficiency, we believe that it should inform the legal pol-
icy toward online infringement. In the proceeding section, we explain
how current law should be changed to enable implementation of the
technological enforcement model we propose.124
123. Today, most webhosts utilize third-party software, with the palpable exception of
Google, which utilizes its own system on YouTube. See What is YouTube’s Content ID
Tool?, YouTube Help, Google, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?
hl=en&answer=83766 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Apr. 27, 2011);
see also Tony Bates, The Perils of YouTube Filtering: Part I, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.
Rev. Blog (Dec. 7, 2007, 3:43 AM), http://www.mttlrblog.org/2007/12/07/the-perils-of-
youtube-filtering-part-1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (commenting on YouTube
policy); Tony Bates, The Perils of YouTube Filtering: Part 2, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.
Rev. Blog (Dec. 7, 2007, 1:10 PM), http://www.mttlrblog.org/2007/12/07/the-perils-of-
youtube-filtering-part-2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
124. Cf. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect
Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L.
Rev. 143, 149 (2007) (“We believe the traditional tort framework offers a balanced and
dynamic mechanism for addressing the many challenges of adapting copyright law to new
technology.”). Menell and Nimmer argue that the law on secondary liability of technology
providers reflects (and should reflect) the tort principle of Reasonable Alternative Design
(RAD), rather than the Supreme Court’s “staple article of commerce” defense, announced
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Under the
RAD principle, “a product is defective in design when its foreseeable risks of harm could
have been reduced or avoided though the adoption of a RAD . . . and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” Menell & Nimmer, supra, at
154. Our Best Available Technology Standard may resemble the RAD principle in this
respect. Under this analysis, the best available technology is a RAD: If adopted, it could
shield webhosts from copyright liability. If not, the webhost’s technology might appear
“defective” and expose the webhost to copyright liability. Note, however, that our standard
is not limited to indirect copyright liability and covers direct liability as well. Also, as
discussed in Part II, the mechanism of our proposal is substantially different from the ex
post mechanism of the RAD principle.
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B. The Best Available Technology Standard
The optimal approach to the challenge of online infringement ap-
pears to suggest that webhosts should employ efficient technology to
screen copyrighted works from their websites based on information pro-
vided to them by content owners. In order to implement this idea in real-
ity, we propose a fundamental change in the liability regime: to substitute
the safe harbor in section 512 with a regime that we term “the technologi-
cal safe harbor.” Under our proposal, webhosts will be exempt from mon-
etary liability if they can show that they employed the “best” filtering tech-
nology available on the market when the alleged infringement occurred.
To get a handle on what we mean by the best available technology, it
is useful to use the reference point of a “perfect screening technology.” A
perfect screening technology is the Platonic form of a filtering technol-
ogy, one that is capable of blocking all infringing materials, yet leaves all
noninfringing materials intact. A perfect screening technology is also per-
fectly cost-effective: It strikes an equilibrium, where the maximum en-
forcement measures that do not inflict undue harm are being taken.
Alas, a perfect screening technology is unattainable. Even the most
accurate filter, which is based on the most updated reference database,
would have few tools to evaluate the legality of posts. Posts may be li-
censed or authorized, or may qualify as fair use.125 It is also possible that
the copyright of the underlying work that owners inserted into the
database has expired126 or perhaps was without merit in the first place.127
Given that seminal concepts of copyright law such as the idea/expression
dichotomy128 and fair use129 are vague standards130 (as opposed to
bright-line rules),131 technological systems, sophisticated though they
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an
infringement of copyright.”).
126. Id. § 106A(d) (setting duration of copyrights).
127. For example, the work might be unoriginal, not fixed, or created by a
government body.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (setting rule that copyright may be claimed only in
“expression” of a work of authorship, and not in its “idea”).
129. Id. § 107.
130. Regarding the idea/expression dichotomy, see, for example, Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can.”); Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of the
Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in American Mass Media, 23 Loy. L.A.
Ent. L. Rev. 301, 362 (2003) (dubbing idea/expression dichotomy a “deceptively simple
concept”). Regarding fair use, see, for example, Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d
661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam) (describing fair use as the “most troublesome
[doctrine] in the whole law of copyright”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser,
Beyond Fair Use, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 93 (2010) (“[C]ourts generally keep the [fair use]
doctrine as vague as possible and decline to provide a formula for what constitutes fair
use.”).
131. Legal norms are generally expressed as either standards or rules. Standards
provide judges with considerable discretion, but result in deficient ex ante certainty, as well
as inconsistency among judges. Rules typically provide little flexibility to judges, and might
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may be, would fall short of the gold mark of perfection. This, however,
does not undermine our proposal in the least, since human-based solu-
tions are both prohibitively costly and impractical and would yield even
poorer outcomes.132
The standard we propose is of necessity more modest than a perfect
screening technology. Compared to a perfect screening technology, the
best available technology standard should be thought of as a second-best
solution. The best available technology is the technology that offers the
best effectiveness/cost ratio.
Effectiveness is measured by the number of infringing works and
noninfringing works allowed. The task of the technology is to identify
and block the greatest number of infringing works and the smallest num-
ber of noninfringing works. Accordingly, effectiveness can be denoted as
a fraction with number of infringing works removed as the numerator
and the number of noninfringing works removed as the denominator.
The larger the number (or ratio), the more effective the technology.
Hence, it should be possible to array all existing technologies based on
their effectiveness. To illustrate, assume that technology A removed 100
infringing works and 2 noninfringing ones. It would be assigned the
number 50. Technology B on the other hand, removed 80 infringing
works and 4 noninfringing ones and would therefore be assigned the
number 20. Based on these numbers, technology A would be considered
more effective than B. It is possible to similarly rank other technologies.
For the purpose of determining effectiveness, we give the same
weight to “false negatives” (infringing posts not blocked) and “false posi-
tives” (noninfringing posts blocked). We chose to do so for two reasons.
First, especially in the absence of empirical data on the relative social cost
of each error, it is impossible to decide whether to err on the side of
“false negatives” or “false positives” even on a particular case, let alone
categorically; permitting infringements lowers the level of copyright pro-
tection, while unnecessary blocking of posts threatens to turn filters into
vehicles that stifle fair use and jeopardize free speech. What is more, in
order to promote optimal copyright protection in the long term, develop-
appear arbitrary or unfair in particular cases. The strength of rules is in providing ex ante
clarity and predictability. On the distinction between rules and standards, see generally
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life 15 (1991) (examining use of rules as “decision-making
characterized by its reliance on entrenched but potentially under- and over- inclusive
generalizations”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (noting “the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent
to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”
(emphasis omitted)); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 381–83
(1985) (describing distinction between rules and standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1995) (“In every area of regulation . . . it is necessary
to choose between general rules and case-by-case decisions.”).
132. See infra Part III.A.
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ers of filtering mechanisms should have an equal incentive to invest in
minimizing both types of mistakes.
Effectiveness, however, is merely the first measure we propose. Cost
must also be a consideration. Given marginal diminishing returns to en-
forcement, it is undesirable to force webhosts to adopt the most effective
technology regardless of its cost. Hence, the price of various technologies
must be incorporated into the calculus and technologies must be com-
pared based on an effectiveness-per-price basis. In principle, if the margi-
nal cost of preventing an infringement is higher than the harm inflicted
by it, then liability should not attach to a website that fails to stop it.133
Clearly, there is a point on the price continuum at which the cost of en-
forcement exceeds the benefit. Hence, only technologies that fall under
that point should be compared, and then among those the technology
that offers the best effectiveness-to-cost combination should be selected.
Clearly, there could be more than one technology that meets the
definition of the best available technology at any given time—if more
than one technology arrives at the same ratio between effectiveness and
cost. Thus, the best available technology standard does not denote a sin-
gle technology, but rather a range of technologies, each of which would
satisfy the standard. As elaborated below,134 webhosts that use any of the
technologies that satisfy the standard will be protected from liability.
C. From Theory to Practice
In the legal reality we envision, content owners will be entitled to
pursue users for posting infringing content. However, they will not be
able to seek monetary relief against webhosts that met the best available
technology standard. Hence, our proposal will reduce the number of
suits against webhosts to the bare minimum, leaving only those webhosts
who failed to employ the best available technology exposed to the risk of
litigation.135 In the proceeding discussion we discuss the steps necessary
for implementation of our proposal and how best to perform each step.
1. Creating a Database of Protected Content. — The first challenge for
effective filtering is informational. Currently, it is often impossible to
know which expressive content is copyrighted by whom. Copyright pro-
tection springs into existence the moment original expression is fixed in
133. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui
Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539, 609–10 (2000) (“A rational regulatory system seeks
an optimal level of enforcement—one that adequately fulfills the statutory purposes while
minimizing social costs.”); Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Geo. L.J. 1131, 1131 (1980)
(noting “an efficient enforcement policy will not deter all antitrust violations because the
cost of deterring some of the violations will be greater than the harm averted”).
134. See infra Part II.C.2.
135. Under the new regime, webhosts would not be obliged to meet the threshold
requirements of section 512(i), to accommodate standard technological measures and to
terminate repeat infringers. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006).
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a tangible medium.136 Registration of copyright claims, though en-
couraged,137 is not a prerequisite for obtaining copyright protection.138
Nor are deposit139 or notice.140 In reality, the vast majority of copyrighted
content is not registered anywhere.141 True, registration is a precondition
for bringing an infringement suit,142 but the Act allows copyright owners
to register their works any time prior to the commencement of litiga-
tion.143 Many copyright owners do not ever attach a copyright notice to
their works.144 And even in cases in which notice was affixed by the
owner, it can often be easily removed from the digital copies that are
uploaded onto websites.145 This means that webhosts cannot rely on any
external sources to ascertain the legal status of content.146 There is no a
priori way to create a comprehensive database of copyrighted works. All
works in the United States are “born” copyrighted,147 and as long as peo-
136. Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
137. Registration is a precondition for bringing an infringement suit, as well as for
statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Id. §§ 411(a), 412.
138. Id. § 408 (“[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection.”).
139. Id. § 407(a) (“Neither the deposit requirements of this subsection nor the
acquisition provisions of subsection (e) are conditions of copyright protection.”).
140. Id. § 401(a) (“[A] notice of copyright as provided by this section may be placed
on publicly distributed copies . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Richard A. Epstein, The
Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 123,
124 (2002) (“[C]opyright law . . . flipped over from a system that protected only rights that
were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether claimed or not.”).
141. Samuelson et al., supra note 116, at 1186 (“Despite the existence of some R
incentives to register copyright claims with the Copyright Office, relatively few authors
actually do so, which means that the public does not have access to useful information
about who the owners are and how to track them down to seek permission.”); see also
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 513 (2004)
(noting “Copyright Office data on the annual number of copyright registrations . . .
suggest[s] that the rate of registration is responsive to relatively small changes in
registration fees”).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 411.
143. See id. § 408(a) (stating registration is permissive and can be done anytime
during copyright term).
144. This claim is evident, considering that all original works that are fixed qualify for
copyright protection, including all blog posts, user comments on news sites, uploaded
homemade clips, and even email messages.
145. Copyright notice comes in the form of the word “copyright” or the symbol “”
(or the abbreviation “Copr.”) followed by the year of first publication and the name of the
copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 (listing forms of notice); see also 37 C.F.R. § 201.20
(2010) (describing methods of affixation and positions that satisfy notice requirement).
Removal of notice might therefore require simply erasing or editing out these symbols or
the snippet where they appear from the work that is being uploaded.
146. Even the Copyright Office’s registry is neither obligatory nor exhaustive. See 17
U.S.C. § 408(a) (noting registration is permissive and can be done anytime during
copyright term); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 Colum. J.L. & Arts 311, 338–41
(2010) (discussing effects of registration).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
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ple continue to create, the contours of the copyrighted world are re-
shaping.148 As a consequence, webhosts must rely on copyright owners to
provide information about the works they want protected—against which
webhosts could check users’ uploads to seek a match.
However, copyright owners cannot realistically be expected to pro-
vide information about their works to each and every website. Imposing
such a requirement on them is asking too much. Nor should webhosts be
required to contact copyright owners for data. Given the ever growing
number of copyright owners and the fact that copyrights are transfera-
ble,149 no webhost can be expected to succeed in identifying all rights
holders, let alone contacting them. The cost of compliance with such a
requirement would clearly be prohibitive.
What should the solution be then? The solution we envision is the
creation of a single database that will contain all relevant information
about copyrighted content.150 The establishment of a central information
148. Some commentators suggest shifting to a formalities-based system, in which
copyright protection would be conditioned upon a work’s registration in a database. Such a
change would not only solve the problem but avoid it in the first place. See Lawrence
Lessig, For the Love of Culture: Google, Copyright, and Our Future, New Republic, Feb. 4,
2010, at 24, 29 (arguing for establishing an “absolute obligation [for domestic authors] to
register their work . . . [when] [f]ailure to register would mean that the work would pass
into the public domain”); see also David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C.
L. Rev. 139, 182 (2009) (“[A]dvocates of increased formalities have suggested that the
Copyright Office create a public database of copyrighted works in order to centralize and
publicize their ownership status as a means of buttressing the public advantages brought by
more formality.”). Such approaches probably fall outside of the Berne Convention as it
currently stands. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 5(1), opened for signature July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 (amended
Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. More nuanced approaches call for
creating stronger incentives for copyright owners to comply with formalities. See, e.g.,
Samuelson et al., supra note 116, at 1198–1202 (recommending creation of system that R
would encourage registration); Sprigman, supra note 141, at 555 (proposing system of R
“new-style” formalities that, although nominally voluntary, are de facto mandatory for any
rightsholder whose work may have commercial value).
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (providing requirements for transfers of copyright
ownership).
150. In practice, modern filters’ databases do not contain the works themselves;
rather, these databases contain fingerprints (i.e., identifiable components of files (also
known as robust hashes or visual signatures)) or watermarks (i.e., embedded visible or
invisible marks that remain in the file even when the file is copied or altered). See June M.
Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for
Law, Media and the Arts, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 385, 447–48 (2004) (describing
watermarks); see also Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in Web War over Piracy,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2007, at C1; Advisory Comm. to the Cong. Internet Caucus, 111th
Annual Technology Policy Exhibition Demonstrators, http://www.netcaucus.org/events/
2008/kickoff/demonstrators.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review)(describing
various filtering technologies); Michael Liedtke, Audible Magic Emerging as Top
Copyright Cop in Digital Revolution, USA Today, Mar. 23, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2007-03-23-magic-police_N.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing rise of particular filtering technology company);
David Kravets, Analysis: FCC Comcast Order Is Open Invitation to Internet Filtering, Wired
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-6\COL602.txt unknown Seq: 29 30-SEP-11 12:16
1222 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:1194
repository will provide content owners with a convenient way to convey
information to webhosts and will also allow webhosts access to the infor-
mation they need to engage in the filtering process.151
The central database we envision may either be created under the
auspices of the Copyright Office or under the supervision of a private
body. Entrusting the creation and management of the database to the
Copyright Office will provide three advantages. First, the Copyright
Office is the most natural reference point for most copyright owners,
many of whom have had past dealings with the Copyright Office for other
purposes.152 Second, and relatedly, the Copyright Office already has in-
formation about all the copyrighted works that have been registered. Fur-
thermore, since registration with the Copyright Office is a precondition
for filing an infringement suit, it makes little sense to force content own-
ers to register their works twice with two separate entities. Third, and
most importantly, it is critical to ensure access to the proposed database
to all website operators and technology developers on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. After all, the information in the database will provide the foun-
dation for the filtering process and all systems must be compatible with it
and have uninterrupted access to it.
Alternatively, the task of managing the database may be entrusted to
a private (or semiprivate) body similar to the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which handles registration of
domain names.153 This alternative is attractive since it can result in a com-
petitive registration market. ICANN’s registry, for example, is fed by vari-
ous secondary registrars, and not directly by content owners. The various
registrants compete among themselves to attract registrations. This com-
petition, in turn, lowers fees and encourages participation by more own-
ers.154 A similar dynamic may emerge in the context of registration of
Threat Level Blog (Aug. 20, 2008, 12:53 PM), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/
08/analysis-fcc-co.html  (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing FCC supports
internet service provider use of filtering to block illegal internet activity). On video
filtering, see Delaney et al., supra note 121. R
151. Our central database is likely to have an additional incidental benefit, in
providing the market with updated information regarding copyright ownership, thus
facilitating licensing markets for copyright works in general. See Samuelson et al., supra
note 116, at 1186 (noting lack of information in market regarding copyright ownership R
harms licensing markets).
152. Copyright owners deal with the Copyright Office when they register and deposit
their works. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (registering work); id. § 407 (depositing work).
Furthermore, because the Copyright Office holds a database of copyrighted works, it is the
natural resource for potential licensees who wish to learn the identities of the copyright
owners of works they wish to license.
153. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN Information, http://
www.icann.org/general (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
154. Professor Lawrence Lessig offered to create a mechanism to turn to a formalities-
based copyright system that would be based on the ICANN model. See Lawrence Lessig,
Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and
Control Creativity 284 (2004). Clearly, competition that would drive down the costs of
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copyrighted content. In this case, competition may emerge not only over
price, but also over the quality of content marking technologies that may
facilitate the filtering process.
The main argument against a central registration system in copyright
law is that formal requirements from copyright owners might deprive au-
thors of value that stems from their works.155 Specifically, the concern is
that owners would lose protection because they failed to comply with
some fine detail of the registration requirements.156 These concerns do
not apply to our model. Under our model, owners who would choose not
to register their works will be able to continue to use their own enforce-
ment measures, as well as to follow the notice and takedown procedure
the current system provides, and which our model retains.157 Therefore,
our proposal does not worsen the situation for content owners relative to
the current regime.158
2. Determining the Best Available Technology. — The next step in imple-
menting our proposal is determining which technologies come under the
best available technology standard. One option is to defer to the courts
that will make these determinations on a case-by-case basis.
The advantages of a post hoc judicial process are that both parties
will be forced to participate in discovery, revealing detailed and accurate
facts regarding their practices. Courts are also neutral and relatively un-
susceptible to capture159 and other public choice problems.160 Most im-
registration would be more important in Lessig’s proposal, where lack of registration
implies denial of copyright.
155. The abandoning of formalities under U.S. law, including a registration
requirement, resulted mainly from the need to comply with the Berne Convention. See
Sprigman, supra note 141, at 543–45 (analyzing reasons why Berne Convention itself R
adopted negative approach towards formalities).
156. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright
Law, 96 Va. L. Rev. 549, 605–06 (2010) (noting concern that “strict formality requirements
were traps for unwary authors”).
157. Owners would not lose copyright protection if they do not register, and
therefore our proposal does not run into a problem with the Berne Convention that
forbids signatories from implementing formalities. The United States became obligated by
the Berne Convention following the Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
158. As we explain, our proposal retains the notice and takedown mechanism that the
current regime provides. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra note 206 and R
accompanying text.
159. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1050 (1997) (describing belief that “agencies were likely to become
‘captured’ by the business organizations that they are charged with regulating”); Richard
Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 917, 935 n.104 (1985)
(“‘Capture’ refers to the tendency of some agencies to favor the industry they are required
to regulate by protecting the industry from outside competition and stifling innovation
that threatens the status quo in the industry.”).
160. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90
B.U. L. Rev. 51, 56–57 (2010) (contending “judicial primacy acts as a bulwark against the
more politicized legislative process or capture-prone administrative rulemaking”);
Francesco Parisi, Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law, in The Encyclopedia
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portantly, courts are best suited to make findings regarding the infring-
ing status of works and fair use, which are required in order to rank the
filters according to their cost-effectiveness.
Nonetheless, we believe that this option should be rejected. As-
signing the task of determining the best available technology to the
courts will come at a significant cost—both in terms of time and in terms
of money. Courts are ill equipped to make technological judgments.
Worse yet, since new technologies appear on the scene all the time—a
challenge discussed in detail in Part III.C—courts will not be able to rely
on precedents and will have to consider every new technology de novo.
This means that litigation may result in conflicting decisions, an outcome
that will substantially undermine the certainty our proposal is designed to
create.161 Judicial processes might also result in strategic behavior by re-
peat players162 and strike suits by content owners who have the financial
resources to withstand lengthy and expensive litigation.163 Finally, courts
typically confine themselves to the dispute before them. They tend to
consider only the claims and interests of the specific parties to the dis-
pute, and are unable to gather information about third parties who are
likely to be affected by their decisions.164
Hence, we propose that the list of best available technologies be de-
termined ex ante by an agency at the Copyright Office, after consulting
members of the copyright and technology industries, webhosts, and the
general public. This agency would have the requisite expertise to deter-
mine which technologies should qualify at any given time. Of course, it
would reconvene periodically to revisit the list and update it as new and
of Public Choice 214, 222 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrick Scheider eds., 2004) (“To the
extent to which judicial bodies are independent from political forces and shielded from
interest group pressure, the process of judicial lawmaking can be considered immune from
the collective decision making failures . . . .”). Public choice problems arise when
regulatory bodies are tilted in favor of the narrow interests of strong, concentrated, and
homogeneous groups at the expense of the social interest. See generally Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 883–906
(1987) (discussing public choice theory in legislation); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875,
877–87 (1975) (proposing economic theory of independent judiciary); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer’s Critique of
Regulation, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 721, 722 (1995) (describing public choice theory).
161. This adds to the general uncertainty that is inherent to the ex post nature of
judicial rulemaking. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of
Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1543, 1593 (2010) (“Since the
process of [judicial] rulemaking is invariably ex post, to the individual actor the law
remains uncertain until a decision is actually rendered.”).
162. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 98 (1974) (defining “repeat player”
as “a unit which has had and anticipates repeated litigation which has low stakes in the
outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests”).
163. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. R
164. See Balganesh, supra note 161, at 1593 (discussing consequences of fact that R
“common law courts create rules from the context of a specific dispute”).
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improved technologies emerge. An alternative approach would be to as-
sign this task to a representative body that would conduct ex ante review
of filtering technologies. This model would closely resemble standard-
setting organizations (SSOs) that agree on technological standards in
other areas.165 Hence, policymakers would be able to draw on the experi-
ence we have had with standard-setting organizations in determining the
composition and procedures of our technology setting body.
Clearly, ex ante mechanisms are also not free from concerns. They
impose participation costs on the relevant parties and may incur consid-
erable public choice problems.166 There is also a risk that the decisions of
the technology setting body might create externalities for under-
represented groups.167 Imbalanced decisions, if they occur, might have
adverse implications across the board, because all webhosts would need
to use a filter that operates under a suboptimal balance between legiti-
mate and infringing content.
For the reasons discussed above,168 we believe that despite these con-
cerns, the proposed ex ante mechanism will provide the superior and
most efficient mechanism, and is the only way to ensure stability and cer-
tainty. Moreover, judicial review on the decisions of the technology set-
ting body will likely mitigate these risks and inform the process of distin-
guishing infringements from fair use.
3. Creation of Filtering Clearinghouses. — Once the list of the best avail-
able technologies has been compiled, the next challenge is to decide how
filtering should be carried out in practice. For the reasons explained
above, individual screening is not cost-effective.169 Demanding each
webhost to incur the cost of installing, maintaining, and updating its own
filtering software will lead to wasteful duplicative expenditures without
any meaningful advantages to content owners or to society. In addition,
the cost of compliance may be prohibitive for many small nonprofit web-
165. Standard-setting organizations are industry groups that set common standards in
a variety of areas, and are especially prevalent in the areas of technology and
telecommunications. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1892–93 (2002) (describing role of standard-
setting organizations).
166. See supra notes 159–160. Such concerns are often raised in the context of R
copyright legislative processes. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2187, 2234–35 (2000)
(reviewing rent seeking by special interest groups in realm of intellectual property
legislation); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal
Perspective, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) (describing lobbying efforts of
interest groups in copyright lawmaking process).
167. For example, mash-up artists or other creators that rely on fair use, as well as the
public’s diffuse interests in preserving fair uses, might continue to be underrepresented
compared to the narrowly focused interests of content industries, causing the latter to
prevail despite representing the less socially optimal outcome.
168. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. R
169. See supra Part II.A.2.
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sites that may lack the financial resources to install and operate such a
system.
A better solution would be to refer all user generated content to sev-
eral central clearinghouses that would conduct the filtering for the
webhosts. Such clearinghouses would provide a significantly more cost-
effective method for filtering. First, they would prevent redundant ex-
penditures of webhosts. Second, they would obviate the need for filtering
vendors to tailor filters for each webhost individually, thus allowing for a
more efficient and less costly production process of filters. Third, clear-
inghouses are likely to be able to negotiate a better price with the produc-
ers of filtering technologies than with individual webhosts.
In theory, one clearinghouse could suffice for conducting filtering
under our model. But, per our above discussion, it is best not to give
monopoly power to one center, in order to ameliorate the risk of supra-
competitive pricing and imbalanced blocking of materials.170 In addition,
the presence of several clearinghouses is also likely to support competi-
tion in the market for filtering products and thereby sustain a steady im-
provement of such technologies. The existence of a number of clearing-
houses would also divide the task and reduce the amount of time it takes
to review content and clear it for posting.
A variant of this general framework would be to allow large websites
to filter in-house. Indeed, it may be more efficient for some webhosts to
integrate the filtering vertically into their operations, as opposed to
purchasing the service from an outside provider. Ronald Coase suggested
that transactions will be organized in the firm when the cost of doing so is
lower than the cost of using the market.171 While the clearinghouse struc-
ture for filtering is generally more efficient, there could be exceptions.
For example, companies whose core business is creating technology and
are also operating webhosts (i.e., Google) might incur considerably lower
costs in creating a filter than other webhosts, or perhaps even in purchas-
ing it from an external company.172
In order not to intervene in what might sometimes be a more effi-
cient state of affairs, we propose that webhosts would be able to request
the inclusion of their own, homemade filtering systems into the list of
best available technologies and, if the filter is at least as effective as the
best available technologies, the use of that filter would entitle the com-
pany to the safe harbor.173
170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
171. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390–92 (1937). For
other factors affecting the boundaries of the firm, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 693–95 (1986).
172. This analysis may explain why YouTube only uses its homemade filter as opposed
to third-party software. See supra note 123. R
173. Since the cost of the filter in this case is going to be borne exclusively by the
webhost itself, there is no need for external checks on the cost parameter. Thus, the filter
only needs to be effective, under the definition in Part II.B.
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D. The Benefits of the Technological Safe Harbor Model
The technological safe harbor model is designed to create appropri-
ate incentives for content owners, webhosts, and technology providers to
join forces and improve copyright enforcement.
Consider, first, the effect of our model on content owners. The pro-
posed regime provides content owners with a strong motivation to share
information about their content with webhosts. Specifically, while regis-
tration is not mandatory,174 our model correlates the level of protection a
copyright owner would receive with the level of data she would provide.
The more accurate the information a content owner provides, the easier
it will be to detect infringements of her content. As a result, content own-
ers would have a strong incentive to update the central database by pro-
viding precise information about works they wish to protect.
As far as webhosts are concerned, our mechanism will eliminate the
twin risks of expensive litigation and monetary liability for copyright in-
fringement by users. Indeed, it will also eliminate the legal uncertainty
webhosts currently face. The use of the clearinghouses by webhosts will
automatically qualify them for safe harbor status. If a copyright infringe-
ment suit is brought against a webhost, all it will have to do to defeat the
lawsuit will be to show that it referred users’ content to a clearinghouse
for filtering at the time of the infringement. Since the webhosts’ practice
of referring content to a clearinghouse will probably become public in-
formation—as webhosts who follow such practices have an interest in
making this fact known—very few cases, if any, will even go to court. In-
deed, copyright owners will have no incentive to bring a lawsuit against a
webhost that refers content to one of the model’s clearinghouses; the
webhost will be protected under our technological safe harbor, and the
lawsuit will surely be rejected. What is more, our model reduces the cost
of webhosts’ compliance with the safe harbor provision. As analyzed
above, the cost of referring materials to a filtering process saves webhosts
the much higher cost of implementing and running the filters
themselves.175
In combination, these two effects—copyright owners’ incentives to
provide data and webhosts’ incentives to filter—would lead to a dramatic
improvement in the efficiency of online copyright enforcement. En-
hanced enforcement would augment the economic incentives of copy-
right industries—as well as amateurs—to produce creative content.176 Fi-
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2006) (defining statutory registration requirements).
175. See supra Part II.A.2.
176. Enforcement of copyright law would enable the system to accomplish its goal,
which is to enhance the incentive to create. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); see also Julie
E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,”
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nally, it would provide webhosts with legal certainty, which is likely to
increase the investment in webhosting platforms.177
Importantly, our proposal has another salutary dynamic effect. Its
implementation would lead to competition in the market of filtering
mechanisms, initiating a virtuous cycle of increasing productivity and effi-
ciency.178 Under our model, filtering clearinghouses, competing to at-
tract webhosts to use their services, would create constant demand for
better filters. This demand would induce technology providers to engage
in accelerated development and improvement of filtering systems.
In other words, our proposed safe harbor is “technology-endorsing”
in the sense that it ensures that superior new technologies will be con-
stantly adopted. This, in turn, would generate competition in the market
for filtering technologies as technology providers would constantly race
for the next best available technology.
Innovation in the filtering arena may generate spillovers beyond the
realm of copyright enforcement and creative industries—although this is
an effect we cannot predict or quantify at this point in time.179 Filtering
systems require optimization of search, identification, and comparison
technologies, as well as automation of otherwise human calculations.180
Each of these technologies could be used separately or in combination
with other technologies to enhance production in other industries.181 As
Mark Lemley and Anthony Reese have noted, “Economic evidence
strongly suggests that those unanticipated future benefits, or ‘spillover’
effects, often exceed the immediate value of most new technologies.”182
97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 471 (1998) (“By guaranteeing authors certain exclusive rights in their
creative products, copyright seeks to furnish authors and publishers, respectively, with
incentives to invest the effort necessary to create works and distribute them to the
public.”).
177. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730–31 (2002) (recognizing, in patent context, “clarity is essential to promote progress,
because it enables efficient investment in innovation”); cf. Kaplow, supra note 131, at 613 R
(arguing absence of clear legal precedent defining rules raises costs to businesses
contemplating future acts); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797,
822–23 (2010) (discussing importance of certainty to innovation and investment in new
technologies).
178. Cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patent Monopoly, 157 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1541, 1555–58 (2009) (discussing virtues of competition in framework of
proposal to replace U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s current monopoly on patent
examination with competitive marketplace).
179. Cf. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma 150 (rev. ed. 2003)
(“[N]either manufacturers nor customers know how or why the products will be
used . . . [or] what specific features of the product will and will not ultimately be valued.”).
180. See infra Part III.A. (discussing functionality of filtering systems in context of fair
use).
181. Clearly, the new tools that would develop can also be put to bad use, such as
undue censorship, and various uses that can create privacy issues. Like most technologies,
filtering systems are nothing but tools that can be utilized differently by different parties.
182. Lemley & Reese, supra note 66, at 1387. R
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III. CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS
This Part addresses four practical and conceptual obstacles to our
proposal. First, we tackle the argument that an automated model cannot,
in principle, deal with fair use cases. Second, we discuss the model’s abil-
ity to handle tolerated use. Third, and finally, we address the challenge of
dynamism—namely, the ability of our model to cope with ongoing im-
provements in filtering technologies.
A. The Challenge of Fair Use
An obvious challenge for our model is how to deal with fair use. De-
termining whether a certain use is “fair” is an intricate task.183 There is no
shared understanding of the doctrine even among judges. Fair use cases
are often marked by frequent reversals, split courts, and inconsistency
even on the Supreme Court level.184 As Judge Posner put it, the fair use
test does not “constitute an algorithm that enables decisions to be ground
out mechanically.”185
We agree that technology cannot provide a perfect solution to the
challenge of fair use. We contend, however, that our model can handle
fair use cases at least as well as the extant regime. To demonstrate that, we
would like to take a step back and describe the filtering process in its
entirety.
In our vision, filtering systems would classify content into one of
three categories. The first category (Category A) would include instances
of blatant copyright infringements, namely posts that constitute verbatim
copies of copyrighted works. Identifying Category A posts should be fairly
straightforward. Such posts will not only match a database item, but
would also comprise that single item in its entirety, or nearly in its en-
183. The test, which applies to six favored uses—criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research—requires a careful analysis of four broadly worded
nonconclusive factors, enshrined in section 107 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006) (“(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used . . . ; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for . . . the copyrighted work.”). These four factors are
illustrative but not exclusive, and courts can consider other parameters as well. See id. But
see infra note 196 and accompanying text (noting courts treat factors as limitative, not R
illustrative).
184. See Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1106–07
(1990) (“Reversals and divided courts are commonplace.”). But see Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549,
574–75 (2008) (“[O]utside of the cases that reached the Supreme Court . . . , [our fair use
case law] has not been marked by especially high reversal, dissent or appeal rates.”).
185. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that section 107 factors “do not mechanistically resolve fair use
issues”).
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tirety.186 Category A cases represent the most significant—and legiti-
mate—concern of copyright owners, because these posts form clear sub-
stitutes for their products and their source of livelihood.187 Accordingly,
Category A posts should automatically be blocked ex ante from appearing
on the site.
Our second proposed category (Category B) would consist of nonin-
fringing posts. This category would comprise posts that contain no traces
of an identifiable work, as well as posts that are licensed or otherwise
authorized.188 All these cases raise no issue of infringement.
The third category (Category C), would contain the “hard cases”—
posts that may qualify as fair uses. We concede that technology cannot
provide an error-proof solution in this case. It should be borne in mind,
though, that human review is not a silver bullet either—as our fair use
jurisprudence may demonstrate.189
We believe then that the optimal solution is a combination of tech-
nological and human review. Initially, the degree of reliance on human
agents might be quite substantial. Over time, however, as filtering tech-
nologies improve, the role of humans is likely to diminish.190
Although filters cannot be expected to conduct a full analytical fair
use examination,191 they could use proxies and quantitative measures as
indications of whether the fair use factors point towards a positive or neg-
ative fair use finding, and increasingly, better align their process with
courts’ fair use decisions.192 For example, technology can test whether a
work is published—an element of the second fair use factor.193 It can also
easily find the amount taken under the third factor. Filters might also be
able to develop proxies for commercialism194 (e.g., the post’s designated
186. The filter would only need to verify that the post has not been authorized or
uploaded by the copyright owner of the underlying work herself. Such information can be
incorporated into the original database.
187. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (“[W]hen a
commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original and serves as a market replacement for it, making
it likely that cognizable market harm to the original will occur.” (citation omitted)).
188. A license can be compulsory, express, or implied. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–115
(making licenses compulsory); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 555–56 (9th
Cir. 1990) (describing express or implied licenses). By authorization we also include posts
that are being uploaded by the copyright owner of the underlying work.
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. R
190. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. R
191. See supra note 183. R
192. This is what software does in other contexts, such as Wall Street trading that is
now dominated by computer programs that utilize algorithm-based statistical analysis to
decide which stocks to invest in.
193. In some instances, such as in the case of photography, however, the question of
whether a work was published can be more complicated, although it is doubtful that the
complexity would carry into the fair use realm. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a
Functional Definition of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1724 (2008).
194. Commercialism serves as an indication against fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994) (“Sony stands for the proposition that the
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audience) and transformativeness195 (e.g., the proportion of original to
unoriginal material in the post)—the two main components of the first
fair use factor.
Making fair use determinations technologically might be further fa-
cilitated by the fact that despite Congress’s invitation to judicial flexibility,
courts without exception apply the four statutory factors exclusively and
attach a binary value to each factor—whether it does or does not point
towards a fair use conclusion.196 Likewise, the filter can take into account
the de facto hierarchy between the factors,197 where “the first and fourth
factors dominate the analysis, with the third and second factors trailing in
significance.”198 Commentators have identified other patterns in the fair
use jurisprudence.199
Since filtering technology is not advanced enough to make qualita-
tive determinations, the switch to technology-based enforcement may be
aided by the adoption of quantitative benchmarks that will substitute to
some degree for qualitative criteria. Specifically, lawmakers (or industry
representatives during the process of creating the list of “best available
technologies”) can agree that certain insignificant appropriations of
‘fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985))); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a
publication was commercial . . . tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (noting noncommercial use
is presumed to be fair use).
195. Transformativeness serves as an indication for fair use. See, e.g., Campbell, 510
U.S. at 578–79 (opining transformative uses further the goal of copyright law).
196. See Beebe, supra note 184, at 563–64 (noting that empirically, courts treat 17 R
U.S.C. § 107 (2006) as limitative and not only illustrative).
197. Courts have generally regarded the second and the third factors as relatively
insignificant. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1421
(S.D. Tex. 1995) (“The third factor . . . is generally considered the least important factor of
the fair use analysis.” (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–50)); Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade of
Chi., 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The nature of the copyrighted work seems to
be the least important and most unclear of the four factors . . . .”). But see Campbell, 510
U.S. at 578 (“All [factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of
the purposes of copyright.”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (referring to second factor as
“highly relevant to whether a given use is fair”).
198. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by
Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 La. L. Rev. 1, 31 (2008); see
also Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1103 (2007) (arguing that
second factor “tends to do little work in swaying the outcome” of the test); Matthew Sag,
God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 Mich.
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 381, 434 (2005) (discussing lesser importance of second
factor).
199. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1645–65 (2004) (concluding fair use doctrine is “explained best as an
analytical tool that focuses on social and cultural patterns”); Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2537 (2009) (identifying several “policy-
relevant clusters” that can predict result of  fair use test).
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copyrighted content will be per se fair use and, thus, will not constitute
copyright infringements.
A blueprint for such quantitative caps can be found in the academic
literature. Kevin Goldman, together with one of us, has advanced specific
ceilings for uses of copyright content without liability.200 These or other
criteria could be employed by policymakers or by industry and public rep-
resentatives in the process of creating the list of best available technolo-
gies to expand the range of permissible uses of content. Minimal appro-
priations neither present a risk of sales displacement nor otherwise usurp
the market of the original work.201 Thus, they should not be blocked by
the filtering process.
Another possibility is that each content owner would set its level of
permissible use individually. We elaborate on this option in our discus-
sion on tolerated use in the next section.202
All this, however, will not obviate the need for some level of human
oversight. Since fair use determinations include qualitative variables—
such as whether the “heart of the [copyrighted work]” was taken as
part of the third factor,203 the benefit that accrues to the public from
the use as part of the first factor, and the market effect of the use as
part of the fourth factor204—some degree of human oversight is inevi-
table with respect to cases falling into Category C, at least in this
stage.205
200. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 80, at 1511–17. For example, the R
contemplated ceiling for literary works would be the lesser of fifteen percent or three
hundred words total (of both the original and the copy). For sound recordings and musical
compositions, the lesser of ten percent or ten seconds cumulatively. For audiovisual works,
the lesser of thirty seconds or ten percent of the original work, as well as display of an
architectural, choreographic, or pictorial work for thirty seconds or less, provided that
those thirty seconds comprise no more than ten percent of the new work. Id.
201. See id. at 1520 (“[T]he implementation of safe harbors is unlikely to significantly
chill the incentive to create new books, songs, and film. The safe harbors we propose
should have a rather minimal effect on the revenues of most copyright owners.”).
202. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. R
203. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985).
204. Another important example is identifying parodies. A parody is the “use of some
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580
(1994); see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendants’ argument that book was both satire and parody);
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(denying preliminary injunction against pornographic animated version of Star Wars-
based parody).
205. This does not mean that technology could not surprise us in the future. Garry
Kasparov famously asserted that a computer would never be able to defeat a Grandmaster
at chess because it lacks intuition and a strategic line of thinking. Yet Kasparov himself lost
to “Deep Blue,” when the more advanced computer effectively traded intuition and
strategy for millions of calculations. Feng-Hsiung Hsu, Behind Deep Blue: Building the
Computer That Defeated the World Chess Champion 92 (2002).
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Finally, our proposal leaves intact the notice and takedown proce-
dure and a reverse notice and takedown mechanism for users.206 Content
owners who identify putatively infringing content will be able to notify
webhosts about the presence of the content and require that it be re-
moved—precisely as they can under section 512. Hence, under our pro-
posal, content owners are not worse off than they are now. Likewise, users
will be expeditiously notified about blocking and removal actions and will
be able to demand that a post be reinstated, in return for waiving their
anonymity.207
Adopting our proposal will not leave fair use worse off than it is to-
day. Under our model, filtering developers would internalize the decision
of whether to refer materials to human review or not. Because technology
providers will not want their effectiveness ranking to be lowered, they will
be careful not to filter out content that has a legitimate claim for fair
use.208 On the other hand, cost and efficacy considerations would push
developers to automate more decisions over time as long as accuracy
would not be reduced. On the whole, filtering system manufacturers have
a strong incentive to respect fair use and improve the ability of their tech-
nologies to handle fair use cases.
B. Efficient Tolerated Uses
A second challenge for our proposal involves tolerated uses. The
term was coined by Tim Wu to refer to uses of copyrighted works that are
technically infringing, yet are consciously not enforced by their copyright
owners.209 Wu further explained that there are various reasons why toler-
ated uses are not being enforced, ranging from simple laziness to the
recognition by the owner that a particular use might be harmless or even
beneficial to her.210
The subgroup of tolerated uses that inflicts no harm on content own-
ers creates more benefit than harm (because these uses benefit the users
who perform and access them, and create no harm to the copyright
owner) and is therefore desirable from a social standpoint. Accordingly,
it is important to allow such uses to exist. Efficient tolerated uses are actu-
ally dealt with quite effectively under the current regime, because when
owners avoid sending takedown notices regarding such uses, the content
206. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2006).
207. Id. § 512(g)(3); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A user could
have content removed, or may have his access terminated entirely. If the content infringes,
justice has been done. But if it does not, speech protected under the First Amendment
could be removed.”).
208. See supra Part II.B. (explaining how effectiveness is measured).
209. Wu, Tolerated Use, supra note 53, at 617. R
210. Id. at 619 (“Reasons can include simple laziness or enforcement costs, a desire to
create goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement creates an economic complement
to the copyrighted work—it actually benefits the owner.”).
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typically remains on the website.211 Our model, in contrast, would treat
all technically infringing contents indiscriminately—and may ultimately
block even efficient tolerated uses.
Admittedly, we only have partial solutions to the efficient tolerated
use problem. One solution is built into the system: Content owners could
decide to tolerate infringements by simply refraining from including in-
formation about their works in the central database that informs the
screening process. Yet, the ex ante nature of such decisions would still
not enable owners to tolerate ex post some uses of works they generally
want protected.
Furthermore, content owners may adopt intermediate positions that
would permit certain types of uses, or permit users to appropriate certain
percentages of their works.212 For example, a content owner may decide
that copying of up to twenty percent of her work would be exempt from
liability and set her screening preferences accordingly. The owner can
further decide to set differential tolerance levels for different works. For
example, for newly released works, set the filter automatically to block
any posting that exceeds seventy percent correspondence of audio and
video, while for older material the tolerance setting might rise to ninety
percent. This can salvage most tolerated uses. Nevertheless a problem will
remain with respect to “mash-ups.” Mash-ups are video clips that contain
original visual content with copyrighted music in the background. And
such content clearly exists.
A possible way to ameliorate this problem could be to inform con-
tent owners of all blocked uses—immediately or periodically—and allow
them to override the filter’s decision and “unblock” the material at any
time.213 Admittedly, this is still a partial solution, because copyright own-
ers may opt in to the default “blocked” status merely because this is the
default or because they do not internalize the benefit from this use.
We concede that our proposal does not effect a Pareto optimal solu-
tion—one that makes at least one person better off while leaving no one
worse off. Yet, there is nothing surprising about that. As Guido Calabresi
powerfully demonstrated, very few legal regimes, if any, satisfy the Pareto
principle.214 Virtually all legal changes create winners and losers. Hence,
we are not daunted by the fact that our proposal will not make everyone
211. As discussed at length in Part I, under the current notice and takedown regime,
webhosts have no incentive to remove infringing content without the request of the
copyright owner.
212. See Robert Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the
Digital Era, 34 Colum. J.L. & Arts 113, 126–27 (2011) (suggesting “selective waiver”
mechanism, in which copyright owners would waive their rights in certain categories).
213. Such a mechanism would be similar to YouTube’s current mechanism. This
mechanism flags to content owners when their material appears on the site and allows
them to choose whether to remove it or share with Google the ad revenues resulting from
it.
214. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 Yale
L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991).
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better off. This cannot be the test for making legal changes. A much
more useful test is to compare the benefits of our proposal with the cost
thereof. Our proposal fares well on this criterion for three reasons.
First, it is important to remember that not all tolerated uses are effi-
cient; many tolerated uses are actually inefficient, namely, overall they
create more harm than benefit.215 The level of tolerated uses is to a large
extent a function of the cost of enforcement—a costly, ineffective en-
forcement process, like the one that exists today, may prevent enforce-
ment against harmful infringers.216 In the absence of empirical data re-
garding the nature of tolerated uses, particularly the reasons why they are
tolerated, it is impossible to know whether our model comprises an over-
all superior or inferior policy to handle tolerated uses.
Second, the attraction of tolerated uses is to a large extent a false
allure. Tolerated uses are an elusive concept. A copyright owner may tol-
erate a use for a certain period of time, but the owner may decide to start
vigorously enforcing its rights at any time.217 Indeed, as the number of
unauthorized uses made of a certain copyrighted work goes up, it be-
comes more likely that the owner of the copyright will commence legal
action against the infringers. This stems from the simple fact that the
owner’s decision whether to “tolerate” a use is not only a function of the
cost of enforcement but also of the expected value she can derive from
the lawsuit.
Finally, and most importantly, the societal interest in protecting
webhosts is far more important than the interest in maintaining all cur-
rently available tolerated uses. The degree to which webhosts are exposed
to liability affects all users and content owners. It is a key determinant of
the future of the Internet. Tolerated uses, while important, present a rela-
tively minor issue in comparison to webhosts’ liability and the need for a
balanced system of copyright enforcement.
C. The Challenge of Improvements
Naturally, the competition we envision in the market for filtering
technologies is expected to constantly yield new and better filtering appli-
cations. In light of this expectation and the adaptive nature of the best
available technology standard, one may wonder whether our technologi-
cal safe harbor will ever shelter webhosts. After all, it is possible that
newer and slightly better filtering systems will appear on the market on a
monthly basis and their appearance may result in a constant reranking of
technologies, with new filtering technologies pushing older ones off the
best available technology list.
215. See Wu, Tolerated Use, supra note 53, at 619 (noting possible reasons for R
tolerated uses).
216. See supra Part I.A (discussing inefficiencies in current enforcement regime).
217. See Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1459, 1486–88 (2008) (noting owners sometimes use a  “hedging” strategy—waiting to see
whether use is harmful or beneficial before taking any enforcement measures).
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This challenge would arise with respect to any adaptive legal stan-
dard, especially those involving technology, because technology improves
at an especially fast pace.218 Although the problem of improvements may
appear daunting at first blush, it is much less formidable upon closer in-
spection. In fact, a simple way to deal with this problem is to base the list
of the “best available technologies” on periodic reviews of the technology,
which will be revised and updated.219 The intervals between updates will
be determined based on the rate at which new filtering systems are pro-
duced and the length of the examination period necessary to establish
the effectiveness of new technologies. Given that there will only be several
clearinghouses and that improvements to filtering technologies are not
easy to produce, the cost of updating the list of best available technolo-
gies should not be too high. It should be borne in mind that other
software applications, games, electronics, and other consumer goods are
routinely reviewed, evaluated, and compared to rival products.220 Such
reviews often involve multidimensional analysis. In our case, by contrast,
the comparison focuses on two dimensions alone, effectiveness and cost,
which should expedite the review process.
Once a periodic review is completed, the filtering centers that need
to replace their technology will be given a certain grace period to do so.
During that period, all webhosts that referred content to the filtering cen-
ters will be fully protected from liability.
IV. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE BEST AVAILABLE
TECHNOLOGY STANDARD
Webhosts are not by any means the only entities that are exposed to
copyright liability by dint of the actions of their users. Copyright liability
poses a critical threat to other internet businesses and entities, many of
which may also benefit from our proposal. This Part explores the possibil-
ity of extending our model to operators of other digital platforms and
internet actors. In particular, we examine the applicability of our model
to operators of peer-to-peer file sharing platforms—who enjoy no safe
harbor under current law—and access providers—for whom our model
could potentially replace the safe harbor they currently enjoy under sec-
tion 512(a).
218. Adaptive standards are open ended and allow the flexibility to leave certain areas
open for future revisions. Adaptive standards are not foreign to copyright law. The
“tangible medium of expression,” for example, was designed to “avoid the artificial and
largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.” H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
219. Updates to the software might occur between the periods.
220. Technology journals and even mainstream newspapers typically contain sections
that compare and review new products on the market.
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A. Applying the Technological Safe Harbor to Peer-to-Peer Services
Peer-to-peer systems are distinct from webhosts in that they do not
store users’ materials on their websites, but rather enable users to access
materials that reside on other users’ hard drives.221
Peer-to-peer file sharing services are not explicitly covered under sec-
tion 512.222 This should be no surprise, given that the first widespread file
sharing service, Napster, was only created after the enactment of the
DMCA.223 Inimical to peer-to-peer services, courts have thus far declined
to read section 512 to protect these services for various reasons.224
Without the protective wings of the DMCA that exempts webhosts
from using filters (in the absence of a “red flag”),225 peer-to-peer services
have been repeatedly criticized when they refrain from deploying filter-
ing mechanisms. Most notably, in Grokster, the Supreme Court viewed file
sharing services’ failure to install filtering devices as evidence of their un-
lawful intent, which in turn tipped the scales towards holding them sec-
ondarily liable for inducing a copyright infringement.226 At the same
time, the Grokster Court itself clarified that lack of filtering cannot by itself
suffice to establish secondary liability.227 Accordingly, the precise effect of
221. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining how peer-to-peer systems operate).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (failing to specify peer-to-peer services).
223. Helman, Secondary Liability, supra note 21, at 134 (noting that excluding newer R
technologies from section 512 “does not reflect a deliberate decision, but rather the
obvious lack of predictive powers”).
224. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[Section 512] provides a series of safe harbors . . . but none in which Aimster can
moor.”); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL
6355911, at *15–*18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (debarring section 512 from file-sharing
service defendant for number of reasons). Peer-to-peer service providers thus incurred
secondary liability in a number of high profile cases. See Columbia Pictures, 2009 WL
6355911  at *19 (granting plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion under inducement of
infringement theory of secondary liability); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (noting while Copyright Act does not expressly
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another, “doctrines of secondary
liability emerged from common law principles and are well established”); Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1025 (“At this stage of the litigation, plaintiffs raise serious questions regarding Napster’s
ability to obtain shelter under § 512 . . . .”); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 508–09, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Grokster to find defendant liable for
inducement of copyright infringement and noting “[Lime Wire]’s failure to mitigate
infringing activities”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 66, at 1369–72 (noting peer-to-peer R
systems often fall outside of section 512, either because they do not qualify as ISPs or
because they do not fall under any of four categories to which safe harbors apply).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
226. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939. Justice Breyer was reluctant to draw conclusions from
the absence of filtering. Id. at 958 (Breyer, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 939 n.12  (majority opinion) (“[I]n the absence of other evidence of
intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on
a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”). The Court’s caution might have stemmed
from its attempt to remain consistent with Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
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lack of filtering on the imposition of liability on grounds of inducement
remains unclear. Tim Wu has interpreted Grokster to suggest that while
failure to filter may not prove bad intent in itself, filtering may negate a
finding of bad intent, effectuating a “safe harbor” from inducement
claims.228 A more attenuated approach is that filtering may serve as an
inconclusive indication of good faith, because filtering does not go along
with an infringement-oriented business plan.229
It is equally unclear under present law what would be considered
adequate filtering. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
held that the goal “is to get [infringements] down to zero.”230 In contrast,
on remand, the district court in Grokster ordered the defendant to use a
filter that meets “the most effective means [to prevent infringements]”
standard.231
We believe that our technological safe harbor regime represents a
better way to go forward. As with webhosts, the model would protect peer-
to-peer services from all types of copyright liability so long as they employ
the best available technology for filtering in their file sharing software.
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984), where an analogous device to a filter, the “broadcast flag,”
was not required. See Meng Ding, Note, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com: A Step Toward
Copyright’s Tort Law Roots, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 373, 384–85 (2008) (“The broadcast
flag was, in large part, analogous to the ‘filtering mechanism’ . . . in Grokster. Since the Sony
Court did not require it, it is hard for the Grokster Court to require it without disturbing
Sony.”). As a comparison, an Australian decision required installation of filtering
mechanisms in peer-to-peer services. See Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v Sharman License
Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 ALR 1, 5–7, 74.
228. See Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 229, 247 (“Grokster
creates a kind of safe harbor . . . . It may be read to suggest that a product that does filter is
presumptively not a product that is intended to promote infringement, even if it does, in
practice, facilitate infringement.”).
229. See Monotype Imaging v. Bitstream, 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888–89 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(finding no inducement because, inter alia, defendant had taken measures to avoid
infringing uses).
230. 284 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting district court opinion). The district
court ordered Napster to switch its current filter—which was based on file names, and was
thus susceptible to circumvention of file names by users—to a superior audio
fingerprinting technology. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld this order. Id. at 1098–99
(“Napster’s original filtering mechanism was unsuccessful in blocking all of plaintiffs’
noticed copyrighted works . . . . It was a proper exercise of the district court’s supervisory
authority to require use of the new filtering mechanism . . . .”); see also Mark A. Lemley &
Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev.
783, 802 (2007) (noting that Napster’s “order effectively required Napster to shut down,
which indeed it did”).
231. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1241
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering defendant to apply “the most effective means available to
reduce the infringing capabilities”). The court recognized that “perfect” filtering was
unattainable. Id. at 1235 (“[Plaintiffs] would require [the service] to shut down until it was
capable of installing a ‘perfect’ filter that could prevent any infringement from occurring.
Yet, the undisputed evidence currently indicates that there is no filtering mechanism that
can ‘exhaustively’ stop every single potential infringement on a peer-to-peer
network . . . .”).
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A technological safe harbor regime would create better incentives
for the operation of legal peer-to-peer services: It would incentivize copy-
right owners to cooperate with file sharing services instead of suing them
and driving them to bankruptcy.232 In addition, it would incentivize file
sharing services to internalize the costs of infringement.233 Finally, it
would open an additional market for filtering technologies—that of peer-
to-peer services. The formalization of a technological safe harbor would
also clear the uncertainty that currently shrouds the status of filtering in
the context of peer-to-peer services.234
There is yet another reason to establish a technological safe harbor
for operators of peer-to-peer platforms: Affording a safe harbor to
webhosts but not to file sharing services will result in a policy that favors
one kind of platform over another, and consequently discourage the cre-
ation of legal peer-to-peer services.235 This would be regrettable, because
peer-to-peer services comprise a rapid, resource-efficient, and overall pos-
itive tool for information sharing.236
One crucial factor, however, renders our safe harbor regime consid-
erably more appealing when applied to webhosts than to peer-to-peer ser-
vices. By contrast to the webhosting context, in the peer-to-peer world
users typically do not need to be in continuous contact with the service
provider in order to share files after downloading the file sharing
software.237 Thus, if a peer-to-peer service shifts to an improved filter, as
the technological safe harbor demands, the new filter would only apply to
the service’s new customers (or those who continually update their
software), and would not affect the software that is already in use. Users
who use the old software would still be using an outdated filter. In this
sense, the dynamic nature of our model is likely to be substantially weaker
in the peer-to-peer framework.
232. See, e.g., supra note 224 (describing several cases in which courts have declined R
to read 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) to protect peer-to-peer services).
233. The current regime creates no incentive for peer-to-peer services to avoid
infringement, because no consistent, realistic standard for filtering applies to them. See
supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text. R
234. See supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text. R
235. See also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 230, at 831 (arguing “irrational, R
technology-based distinctions create distortions, unfair competitive advantages, and
arbitrage opportunities”).
236. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 19–25 (describing how peer-to-peer networks R
promote efficiency and freedom); Lital Helman, When Your Recording Agency Turns into
an Agency Problem: The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA 49, 87–88
(2009) (describing benefits of file sharing).
237. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921–22
(2005).
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B. Applying the Technological Safe Harbor to Access Providers
The potential liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)238 for in-
fringing content passing through their system is governed by section
512(a). The section establishes a safe harbor for ISPs, which shelters
them from monetary liability for copyright infringement.239 Like
webhosts, ISPs are also exempted under the existing regime from the
need to engage in filtering.240 To qualify under the safe harbor estab-
lished by section 512(a), ISPs must be neutral and refrain from interfer-
ing in the transmission of content through their pipelines beyond what is
necessary for routing it.241 For reasons mostly unrelated to copyright en-
forcement, however, ISPs have begun to move away from neutrality in
recent years, by deploying “intelligent” routers within their networks,
which enable them to inspect and monitor the traffic they carry.242 The
more involved ISPs become in monitoring content, the less eligible they
might become for the section 512(a) safe harbor.243
At first blush, our model seems to provide a balanced practical
framework for administering ISP liability.244 Our model would provide an
238. The term ISP is used at times in a wide sense, to encompass both access providers
and other types of online service providers. We use the term narrowly to address only
access providers, typically broadband services.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006) provides:
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing
connections for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by
or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage
of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing
connections . . . .
The safe harbor is conditioned upon the ISP fulfilling the statute’s conditions. See infra
note 241 and accompanying text. R
240. 17 U.S.C § 512(a), (m).
241. To qualify under section 512(a), an ISP must meet five conditions: (1) the
transmission must not be initiated by the ISP itself; (2) the transmission must be automatic,
and involve no selection of the information by the ISP; (3) the ISP must not select the
recipient of the transmission; (4) the ISP must not host the information except transiently,
as is necessary to transmit it; and (5) the ISP must not modify the information. Id. § 512
(a)(1)–(5).
242. See Bridy, supra note 92, at 106 (noting ISPs’ transition to “intrusive traffic R
management or shaping”); Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1417, 1432–37 (describing invasive new monitoring by ISPs); see also Peter K.
Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1373, 1387 (2010) (exploring possibility of
ISPs undertaking inspection and monitoring).
243. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers,
18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 633, 645 (2008) (“The output of affordable
deep packet inspection . . . raises questions whether non-neutral network operation
disqualifies ISPs for a safe harbor exemption from liability for carrying copyright infringing
traffic provided by § 512 of the DMCA.”).
244. This discussion assumes that ISP filtering would be legal, either as “reasonable
network management” or otherwise. Indeed, although filtering by ISPs may run into
problems with net neutrality principles, see, e.g., Ohm, supra note 242, at 1492, it is R
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alternative to the diminishing section 512(a); one that would allow ISPs
to conduct some controlled surveillance of copyright infringements, stop-
ping it at the source, yet would include safeguards to assure blocking is
not excessive. What is more, the issue of filtering by ISPs has been on the
global public agenda for some time now.245
Yet, in our opinion, applying our system to ISPs will yield considera-
bly more harm than benefit. First, surveillance of users’ online behavior
by ISPs is likely to have implications beyond the copyright realm. Chief
among those are innovation policy,246 privacy,247 censorship,248 and
others.249 Applying our system to ISPs would encourage ISPs to engage in
surveillance from the narrow prism of copyright law, without attending to
all the complicated issues this measure might imply beyond.
Second, despite the similar result for the user whose content gets
blocked, filtering by ISPs might prove far more hazardous than filtering
estimated that the FCC is not likely to prevent ISPs’ monitoring of networks for copyright-
related reasons. See Bridy, supra note 92, at 132 (“The FCC . . . is unlikely to intervene in R
the name of net neutrality to prevent this private (re)ordering by, for example, prohibiting
content blocking or filtering by ISPs.”). Note, however, that an attempt to explicitly
include copyright filtering as legitimate network management failed. Compare 155 Cong.
Rec. S1738 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (showing text of proposed amendment 417, referring
to deterring copyright infringement), with American Recovery and Reinvestement Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (failing to include any reference to copyright
infringement).
245. See, for instance, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Proposed
Draft 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review), which might pave the way for ISP filtering in the United States, the European
Union, Australia, Japan, Canada and a number of other nations.
246. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
94 Geo. L.J. 1847, 1851 n.13 (2006) (noting “network neutrality proponents defend their
proposals almost exclusively in terms of the economic benefits of innovation”); see
generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. on Telecomm. &
High Tech. L. 141 (2003) (discussing regulation of broadband providers).
247. See Ohm, supra note 242, at 1432–37 (describing aggressive expansion of R
network monitoring and predicting that “will eviscerate user privacy”); see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2712 (2006) (addressing
interception of and access to wire and electronic communications).
248. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for
Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 105, 119–24 (2010)
(discussing potential bias when carriers can influence content); Kevin Werbach, The
Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It
Apart, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 343, 367 (2008) (opposing filtering because of censorship’s
threat “to the structure and universality of the Internet itself”); Letter from Open Internet
Coal. to Cong. (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.openinternetcoalition.org/files/
OIC_DPI_Iran_062909.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing repressive
regimes’ use of deep packet inspection for spying and censorship and warning of potential
misuse in United States).
249. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 248, at 108 (pointing to “a new host of concerns R
about privacy, culture, and power online”); see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642,
644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (involving Comcast’s monitoring of BitTorrent traffic, and
concluding FCC lacks authority to enforce network neutrality rules over broadband
internet providers).
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by webhosts. ISP filtering would involve scrutinizing all internet traffic in
real time, and necessarily degrade the performance of the system.250 Sim-
ilarly, contrary to the free business model of webhosts, the costs associ-
ated with filtering by ISPs (e.g., purchasing and maintaining filtering
hardware and software) are likely to be passed on to subscribers, decreas-
ing the affordability of broadband services. Worse yet, the lack of trans-
parency that exists regarding ISPs’ practices251 and the lack of meaning-
ful alternatives and competition among ISP services252 render ISPs much
more likely to surrender users’ interests in the face of pressures from
content owners concerning the operation of filters.253
It appears that filtering by ISPs involves substantially more complex
considerations than filtering by webhosts. This, of course, does not imply
that copyright law should not be a factor in the analysis. On the contrary,
we believe that it is an important consideration. Yet, in this case, it should
be balanced against potentially more weighty considerations. Hence, in
so far as establishing a technological safe harbor for ISPs is concerned, we
believe we should proceed with caution. That said, we suggest that if ISPs
would ever be allowed to conduct filtering for copyright purposes, then
the standard of best available technology should act as a safeguard to
ensure that the incentives are in place to guarantee that users’ rights are
protected.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a technological safe harbor that would protect
webhosts from monetary liability for copyright infringement. Per our pro-
posal, webhosts would be immune from liability as long as they employ
the best filtering technology available on the market. We demonstrate
that adopting our proposal would yield several important advantages rela-
tive to the existing legal regime. First, it would give webhosts the legal
certainty they need in order to grow and develop. Second, it would sub-
stantially improve effective and balanced copyright enforcement, by cre-
ating incentives for copyright owners, webhosts, and technology providers
to collaborate towards an optimal scheme of copyright enforcement. Fur-
thermore, the design of our proposal would dramatically reduce litiga-
250. Tim Wu, Has AT&T Lost its Mind?, Slate (Jan. 16, 2008, 10:15 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2182152 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (responding to AT&T’s
proposal to examine all traffic carried on its network).
251. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg.
62,638, 62,640 (Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (noting ISPs generally do
not disclose their network management practices).
252. See Ohm, supra note 242, at 1476 (noting “[i]n most parts of the United States, R
the only two choices [for internet connectivity] are DSL from the telephone company and
a cable modem from the cable company”).
253. See Pasquale, supra note 248, at 119–23 (“Given that most consumers have only R
one or two options, if any, for broadband connectivity, network providers can easily use
their services to subtly advance their own political or cultural agendas without much fear of
losing customers.”).
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tion in this area of the law and completely obviate lawsuits, such as Viacom
v. YouTube. Finally, the proposal, if implemented, would promote dy-
namic efficiency by spurring competition in the market for filtering sys-
tems. Competition in the market for filtering technologies will lead to
more accurate detection of infringement and as a result, would enhance
balanced copyright enforcement over time.
At the end of the day, legal challenges that are born out of techno-
logical advancements often call for technological solutions. The chal-
lenge of online infringement is a case in point in our opinion. Given the
exponential rate at which new content—infringing and noninfringing—
is posted onto websites and the fact that creativity in digital media is
largely based on preexisting materials, webhosts cannot possibly detect
every single case of copyright infringement. Nor is it socially desirable to
require them to screen content manually. The imposition of such a re-
quirement would dramatically increase operation costs for all webhosts,
which may lead to the demise of many small websites. Accordingly, filter-
ing technologies appear to mark the only viable way to move forward.
This realization is not ours alone; it is shared by leading industry
participants who have adopted variants of our proposal through private
agreements. Given the generality of the problem, transaction costs, and
pressing need for a solution, we believe that legislative intervention is in
order. The blueprint we provide in this Article may aid lawmakers in
crafting innovative legal solutions not only to the challenge of webhost-
ing, but also to the ongoing struggle of file sharing via the peer-to-peer
platform, and may even inform some changes in the policy concerning
the liability of ISPs. In sum, it provides a general analytical framework for
reshaping online liability.
